University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2011

Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking
Amnon Lehavi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lehavi, Amnon, "Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking" (2011). Minnesota Law Review. 393.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/393

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking
Amnon Lehavi†
INTRODUCTION
Can a court commit a wrong? Could it be viewed at times
as violating the legal rights of litigants, and of citizens more
broadly, in rendering a decision? More specifically, can a court
infringe on constitutionally protected rights the same way that
a legislature or an administrative agency might, and if so, what
should be the consequences of such a violation?
In some instances, the answers to these questions would be
straightforward enough or generally negligible. When a court
abruptly ignores the required legal process by, for example, arbitrarily refusing to hear the arguments of one of the parties,
when it rules in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, or
when it makes a decision by tossing a coin, the infringement of
the litigant‘s rights would follow from the fact that the court
exceeded its authority, violated the due process of law, and so
forth. In some other cases, we may say that the court was clearly erroneous in its decision, although we should not necessarily
contend that it has committed a wrong in the sense of violating
a party‘s legally enshrined rights.1 This would be so, for example, when a superior court disagrees with the way in which a
lower court interpreted a certain statutory provision. Such a
flawed ruling would simply be reversed by the higher court,
† Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Herzliya, and Academic Director, Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, IDC Herzliya. LL.M., J.S.D, Yale Law School. For helpful comments and suggestions, I
thank Aharon Barak, Barry Friedman, Fred Schauer, Yoram Shachar, and
Simon Stern. Copyright © 2011 by Amnon Lehavi.
1. See Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1817–27 (2005) (noting that not every reversal necessarily implies
that the lower court committed a judicial wrong). Extreme abuses of discretion
would trigger the thought that the judge has grossly exceeded the boundaries
of his legitimacy, but ―to denounce a judicial act as illegitimate typically expresses a strong condemnation. Virtually no one would characterize every
judicial ruling reversed on appeal as legally illegitimate.‖ Id. at 1817–18.
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regardless of whether we view the judicial act as constituting a
―wrong.‖2
There are many other cases, however, in which the question of whether judicial action constitutes a violation of rights
is a complex and ambiguous one. These cases nevertheless have
major potential consequences. This arises especially when the
court can be viewed neither as exceeding its authority or acting
arbitrarily, or as being merely incorrect about a certain point of
law. It is then that the question of a ―judicial wrong‖ comes to
the forefront.
In the recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, four of the
eight participating U.S. Supreme Court Justices seem to have
dramatically broadened the potential scope of judicial wrongs.3
They did so by formulating a new doctrine of ―judicial taking,‖
while at the same time deciding that no such taking had occurred in the present case.4 According to this opinion, ―if a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established
right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that
property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated
it or destroyed its value by regulation.‖5 In a concurring opinion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg left ―for another day‖ the
question as to whether a judicial decision could amount to a
taking.6
Thus, under this tentative new doctrine, when a state court
of last resort dramatically reforms state property law, with
such a shift resulting in a systematic reallocation of property
rights and duties, this ruling might violate the Fifth Amendment‘s Takings Clause.7 This would be so even if the court was
2. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed
from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636– 43 (1971) (differentiating between
primary and secondary judicial discretion). Primary discretion endows the
trial judge with a ―wide range of choice as to what he decides . . . .‖ Id. at 637.
Secondary discretion deals with ―hierarchical relations among judges,‖ whenever the system prescribes the degree of finality and authority a lower court
enjoys, so that in some cases a trial judge would have a ―right to be wrong
without incurring reversal.‖ Id. But even when reversal is at stake, so that a
wrong decision would be overturned, this does not entirely undermine the decision-making legitimacy of the trial judge. See id. at 641 (―A trial court determination that is discretionary . . . has a status or authority that makes it
either unchallengeable, or challengeable to only a restricted degree.‖).
3. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597–613 (2010).
4. Id. at 2612–13.
5. Id. at 2602.
6. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 2602 ( plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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authorized to act in view of the allocation of powers among the
state‘s institutions, if such a doctrinal shift is not prohibited by
the state‘s constitution and statutory law, and if the court meticulously followed procedural due process rules in its decision
making.8 Under this approach, the identity of the branch of
government committing the constitutional violation does not
matter.9 For this purpose, says Justice Scalia, writing for the
plurality, the state court is viewed as just another state actor.10
The main argument advanced in this Article is that such a
jurisprudential approach may have dramatic, if unintended,
consequences regarding the role of courts as lawmakers and
state actors. Accordingly, this approach may redefine the role of
the U.S. Supreme Court in overseeing law-reforming decisions
by state courts in matters dealing primarily with state law, but
which also raise a federal constitutional question. In many respects, the approach suggested by Scalia brings up issues that
have remained largely unanswered since the seminal Court
decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer11 and New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.12
In Shelley, the Court struck down a state judicial decree
that upheld a privately drafted racial covenant forbidding the
sale of the property to non-whites.13 The state court based its
decision on state common law principles and the private nature
of the dispute.14 The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that since
the state court is a ―state actor‖ in its own right, then by rendering a judgment upholding the covenant, the state court‘s
decision has implicated, and violated, the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause.15
In the aftermath of Shelley, courts and commentators have
dealt mainly with the way in which this decision would blur the
distinction between private and public law.16 This focus has
also dominated the legacy of Sullivan, in which the Court sub8. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
9. See id. (―[T]he particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a
court declares that what was once an established right of private property no
longer exists, it has taken that property . . . .‖).
10. Id.
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
13. 334 U.S. at 20.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 16–22; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. For an overview of Shelley and its implications, see discussion infra
Part I.B.

2011]

JUDICIAL LAWMAKING

523

jected state common law libel to constitutional scrutiny and
imposed limits on damages for public officials in libel actions,
in order to preserve the First Amendment‘s guarantees of freedom of speech and the press.17 Beyond the development of this
new doctrine, the chief jurisprudential discourse that evolved
in the aftermath of Sullivan concerned the way in which this
decision established a ―horizontal application‖ of constitutional
norms to private legal disputes.18
But the focus of this Article is quite different, as are the
lines that it wishes to draw between Shelley, Sullivan, and
Stop the Beach. This Article examines key insights that these
cases may provide for evaluating the institutional role of courts
within the system of government. This implicates not only the
relationships among courts and legislatures or administrative
agencies, but also among different types of courts: one acting in
the capacity of a judicial lawmaker, and the other serving as a
judicial reviewer. In so doing, this Article delineates an innovative theoretical framework for addressing potential frictions
within the judiciary that occur whenever the federal reviewing
court is asked to examine an alleged constitutional wrong
committed by the lawmaking state court.
This Article is structured in four Parts. Part I analyzes the
complex evolution of the concept of courts as being both lawmakers and state actors. It starts with a concise survey of the
competing views of courts as either ―law-finders‖ or ―lawmakers.‖ It then moves to discuss the depiction of courts as a
state actor and the nontrivial implications that such an analysis had in the Shelley case. It argues that although the Shelley
ruling has been practically abandoned with respect to the ―constitutionalization‖ of private conduct, its state-actor reasoning
nevertheless leaves open some intriguing dilemmas about the
institutional role of courts and the constitutional review of
their action. This Part concludes by briefly analyzing current
constraints on judicial lawmaking by state courts. It discusses
both internal limits implicated by intra-state separation of
powers doctrines and external limits stemming from potential
intervention by lawmaking federal courts.
17. 376 U.S. at 265–66, 279–83.
18. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional
Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 434 – 47 (2003) (arguing that Sullivan establishes a strong version of ―indirect horizontal application‖ of constitutional
norms to private law disputes, so that while private actors have no direct constitutional duties, all laws, including private law rules, could be subjected to
constitutional review).
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Part II analyzes the recent Stop the Beach case. After discussing the differences of opinion between the groups of Justices about the doctrine of judicial taking, this Part seeks to identify the broader jurisprudential features of the decision. Some
of these issues have been explicitly addressed by the Court.
This is so, for example, for the debate between Justice Scalia
and Justice Kennedy concerning the possibility of constraining
the power of a state court to dramatically change property
rights by holding that such a change would violate the Due
Process doctrine. The two Justices also debate whether recognizing a ―judicial taking‖ could be seen as potentially expanding the power of courts to effect such dramatic changes, in the
sense that the law-changing decision would remain valid subject to the payment of ―Just Compensation.‖19
Many other issues have been left untouched by the Court,
despite their potential dramatic implications. For example, although Justice Scalia sees courts as just another state actor for
purposes of the Takings Clause,20 and all Justices seem to acknowledge the fact that courts engage in the creation of law,
none of the opinions discuss the extent to which courts should
be viewed more broadly as state actors engaged with setting
legal policy.21 Specifically, none consider whether courts should
be granted more, less, or the same level of deference by the Supreme Court, as compared with other branches of government,
when their norm making is being challenged as violating federal constitutional rights.22
Part III takes up this challenge. Assume that, within a certain state, a court is considered, from a separation-of-powers
viewpoint, as legitimately engaging in lawmaking and policy
making in a certain field of law. This is so, for example, when a
court revises the doctrine of adverse possession by eliminating
the requirement that the possession has to be continuous for
the statutory period, an element that had been established in
its previous case law.23 In so doing, the state court reasons that
such a reform is mandated by the fact that in the contemporary
era, landowners have better information about potential en19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
20. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
21. See id. at 2592–619.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 120–22 (7th ed. 2010)
(discussing the broader contours of this doctrine).
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croachments, and that there is a growing societal need to use
lands efficiently.
Or, consider another scenario in which a state court revises
the doctrine of the right of redemption, rooted in historic judicially designed equity ideas.24 The court reasons that with the
change of times, this right is now often being abused by homeowners who fail to pay their mortgages when house values go
down and resume doing so only when the market goes up
again, even if this happens only after they formally default on
their mortgage. In light of this, the court decides that the doctrine would now generally apply only to homeowners who live
below the federal poverty line or who own no other real property. A defaulting debtor denied the right of redemption based on
the new criterion contends that the ruling not only takes her
property under the Fifth Amendment, but also violates the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause. Again, assume that such a reform is considered legitimate from the
state‘s viewpoint on separation of powers.
When such state judicial decisions are brought before the
U.S. Supreme Court on the argument that they violate the
plaintiff‘s federal constitutional rights, should the Court see
the case as a conventional ―vertical‖ intra-judicial matter, and
in appropriate cases say that the state court was wrong as a
matter of law? Or should it engage in the ―classic‖ type of judicial review, as if it were examining a legislative or administrative provision?
The latter approach would be based on the view of courts
as law-makers and not merely as law-finders, but would nevertheless raise an additional set of questions. For example,
should the Supreme Court as judicial reviewer defer to the
state court‘s discretion as lawmaker and policy maker to the
exact same degree that is does for other branches of government? And should there be a difference in the Court‘s policy to
a judicial reform in a pure common law doctrine vis-à-vis an
innovative judicial interpretation of a state statutory provision?
Part IV suggests a potential way out of the tautologies and
institutional quagmires that may haunt the adoption of an expansive ―judicial review of judicial lawmaking‖ model. The suggested blueprint starts with the argument that in contemporary legal systems, the judicial development of law is almost
24. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 577, 583–85, 590–604 (1988) (examining the history of this doctrine and
related policy considerations).
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always being done against a background of legislative or administrative ordering, even in traditional common law doctrines. Adverse possession, for example, is a longstanding mixture of statutes and case law. This Part identifies the choice
that legislatures and executive bodies often make between
promulgating norms as either hard-edged rules or as openended standards, and how such a choice implicates the future
development of law by judicial norm making. It argues that the
dynamic need for gap filling of vague or lacking provisions legitimizes judicial lawmaking, while at the same time maintaining the original nexus to the statute or administrative provision. Consequently, most potential cases of ―judicial wrongs,‖
including ―judicial taking‖ ones, can be reconceptualized as
judicial innovations that are nevertheless based on a legislative
or executive mandate and reviewed accordingly.
While such an approach would not entirely eliminate the
possibility of a ―judicial wrong‖ scenario, it would definitely
scale it down. Accordingly, this jurisprudential approach would
significantly ease the tension involved with the potential undermining of the nature and structure of the judicial branch. It
would strengthen the constant dialogue among the different
branches of government within each state system, and make
better sense of the federal structure and the interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution. In so doing, the legal system would be
better able to address the constant need for the progress of law
in the modern administrative State, while minimizing unintended implications that may undermine the delicate balance
between government‘s decision making institutions.
I. THE COURT AS LAWMAKER AND STATE ACTOR
This Part examines, first, the intricate history of courts as
―law-makers‖ and not merely as ―law-finders.‖ While this legal
reality has typified Anglo-American courts for centuries, it was
probably only at the turn of the twentieth century that jurisprudential discourse started analyzing this phenomenon explicitly and systematically. This Part then ties the lawmaking
trait of courts to their depiction as state actors, a viewpoint
that led to a groundbreaking result in Shelley and to heightened controversy in its aftermath.
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A. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN THE
COMMON LAW
Courts in the English common law tradition, and consequently in the American system, have always engaged in developing the law against the tension of rhetoric and practice.25
Judges and early English legal thinkers emphasized ―historicity as the source of authority of the common law‖ judicial enterprise.26 In rendering their decisions, judges looked to the ancient law of the land, dating back to time immemorial.27 As
J.G.A. Pocock argues, early seventeenth-century thinkers such
as Sir Edward Coke employed this concept against the background of the political power struggle in England.28 The concept of an ―ancient constitution,‖ allegedly dating back to the
days before the Norman Conquest, served the goal of restraining extensive powers claimed by the King.29
―At the same time, common lawyers exalted custom as embodying the results of judicial efforts to improve the law over a
long period of time, resulting in what Coke dubbed the common
law‘s ‗artificial reason.‘‖30 This reliance on custom explains the
English practical tendency ―to read existing law into the remote
past.‖31 The common law thus constantly looked both backward
to history and precedents, and forward to allow common law
rules to develop so as to meet the changing needs of society.32
The extent to which this backward-forward nature of the common law was authentic or merely a pretext for granting judges
more power to design the law remains contested, but it is clear
that in practice, English common law courts have been constantly engaged in judicial lawmaking.33
25. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism,
59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006) (outlining the history of the common law tradition).
26. Id. at 581.
27. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL
LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 37 (1957) (―But by Coke‘s time the increasing activity of a nearly sovereign monarchy had made it seem to most common lawyers that if a right
was to be rooted in custom and rendered independent of the sovereign‘s interference it must be shown to be immemorial . . . .‖).
28. Id. at 31–32.
29. See id. at 51–53.
30. Meyler, supra note 25, at 585.
31. POCOCK, supra note 27, at 31.
32. See Meyler, supra note 25, at 588.
33. See id. at 588 (arguing that Edward Coke developed the idea of what
she terms ―common law originalism,‖ by which ―reliance on precedents furnished a certain kind of authority, yet prior case reports themselves might not
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This pattern has also typified the development of the common law in the American colonies, and later in the United
States. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams aimed at tracing the
―true‖ common law to the ancient English past,34 but at the
same time, the common law has constantly developed in a different fashion among the various colonies and later among the
various states.35 It was probably, however, only with the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and the twentieth-century
legal realists that the concept of common law judges making
law, and not merely discovering it, became explicitly entrenched in American jurisprudence.36
This lawmaking function has been recognized as taking
place in a multitude of settings, such as when judges create
new doctrines in traditional common law areas, construct a
doctrine against the background of a largely indeterminate statute, or engage in the interpretation of ―capacious‖ constitutional language.37 Maybe most instructive is Justice Scalia‘s
provide satisfactory reasons for particular outcomes,‖ so that ―reading, rereading, and interpretation were essential‖).
34. See id. at 567–71 (explaining how Jefferson dated the ―true‖ common
law to the era before the Magna Carta and how Adams dated the ―true‖ common law to the ―ancient constitution‖).
35. See id. at 575 (―The treatment of the common law—and divergences
therefrom—in the early states further substantiates the founding generation‘s
recognition that regional common law in America deviated in parts significantly from the English model.‖). This has also implicated the more general query
about the stability or dynamism of the judicial enterprise. Several authors,
including Justice Antonin Scalia in his opinions and academic writings, have
relied on William Blackstone‘s Commentaries on the Laws of England and
other texts to argue that the common law around the time of independence
was viewed as fixed, stable, and unified. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 472–78 (2001) (Scalia J., dissenting); see also Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9–12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (―It is only
in this century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge
that judges in fact ‗make‘ the common law, and that each state has its own.‖).
However, a multitude of other sources point to the fact that not only was the
common law constantly evolving both in England and in the young United
States during that time, but also that a significant level of dynamism and development was recognized as a legitimate component of the judicial role within
the emerging American system of law. See generally Meyler, supra note 25, at
567–80 (discussing the view that judges have taken license to change and update the common law throughout American and English history).
36. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
883, 886 (2006) (noting that with the rise of legal realism, it ―is thus no longer
especially controversial to insist that common law judges make law‖).
37. See, e.g., id. at 886–88 (discussing various methods by which judges
create common law doctrines).
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statement in his Stop the Beach opinion, which stated that at
the time that the Constitution had been adopted, ―courts had
no power to ‗change‘ the common law,‖ but as of the nineteenth
century, courts ―did assume the power to change the common
law . . . .‖38
The general recognition that courts do at times engage in
lawmaking does not, however, dictate a single viewpoint about
the proper scope of this power. It suffices to say at this point
that even if the American system of government is generally
sympathetic to the judicial lawmaking capacity, so that alongside its dispute-resolution chore exists a ―second paramount
function of the courts [which] is the enrichment of the supply of
legal rules,‖39 then the different features of the court as lawmaker must be addressed in finer detail.40 The structure of
modern government would be seriously undermined if the scope
of legitimacy, process, and methodology of judicial lawmaking
remain obscure.
For purposes of the current study, I focus attention on
what is perhaps the least-contestable legal setting in which the
court makes law: the judicial development of traditional common law doctrines, most notably in the different fields of private law. It is this sphere of activity in which Justice Aharon
Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, views
the court as the ―senior partner‖ among the governmental entities in the crafting of the law.41 Even a conservative such as
Justice Scalia has asserted that ―[he is] content to leave the
common law, and the process of developing the common law,
where it is,‖ while opposing the application of the common law
―attitude‖ to statutory and constitutional interpretation.42
There is, of course, much debate as to whether the common
law dispute-based methodology is the best strategy to devise a
set of legal norms to consistently and coherently order future
38. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2606 (2010).
39. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4
(1988).
40. See discussion infra Part I.B.
41. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 33–36 (2002).
42. Scalia, supra note 35, at 12. This latter caveat stands, of course, as the
basis of Scalia‘s theory of textual interpretation of statutes and of the ―original
understanding‖ in constitutional interpretation. See id. at 14 –15 (arguing for
a standard ―scientific‖ method of statutory interpretation, and arguing against
allowing judges to modify the effect of statutes through interpretation and the
common law).
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legal relationships within a certain field of law. Even if courts
are well aware of the potential ―distorting effect‖ that a specific
dispute may have on the broader legal principles that they develop,43 it is unlikely that courts would, or should, be able to
perfectly mimic the abstract process and substantive products
of statutory lawmaking.44
In addition, numerous institutional considerations cast
doubt on the ability of courts to legislate broad-based norms
even within their natural habitat of common law jurisprudence.
First, as Barak himself notes, courts may lack reliable information about society and broader-based facts that might justify a
change of the law.45 Second, even if courts are given full confidence as policy makers so that they can incorporate societal
values such as redistribution of resources, or otherwise engage
in pushing forward broad-based social reform within the contours of common law doctrines, courts lack both the ―purse‖46
and the organizational mechanisms—i.e., governmental bureaucracy or agencies—to guarantee the initial feasibility and
the future implementation of the legal reform.47 Third, the ability of the court to update, revise, or entirely overturn a piece of
legislation is dependent on having the case before it.48 Unlike a
43. See generally Schauer, supra note 36, at 897–98 (discussing such potential distortions, including the fact that judges may be captivated by the way
that a certain case is framed).
44. See, e.g., id. at 915 (discussing how facial challenges to statutes necessarily require judges to imagine the total array of possibilities as to how the
statute could be applied, but these judges‘ perceptions are inevitably skewed
by the facts of the cases before them). As Schauer notes, this does not mean
that legislatures are free of the influence of special interests. Id. at 912–13.
But legislation is generally considered to represent ―abstract reasoning‖ in
norm-making, detached from the details of a specific dispute. See Catherine
Valcke, Legal Education in a “Mixed Jurisdiction”: The Quebec Experience, 10
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 61, 99–109 (1995) (discussing ―meta-legal‖ scholarship
as a method of legal reasoning that incorporates considerations into lawmaking that come from outside the legal field).
45. Barak, supra note 41, at 32–33; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW‘S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 60–70 (2001)
(establishing an elaborate analysis of the institutional constraints of courts in
addressing complex sets of data that involve large, often indefinite numbers of
stakeholders).
46. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―The Court‘s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.‖).
47. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 423 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that litigation steers activists for change to an institution that is unable to help them and diverts crucial
resources away from the only realm that matters: politics).
48. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 913–16.
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legislature or administrative agency that can initiate a rule
change or control its timing, courts must depend on an exogenous factor—a relevant dispute brought before them.49 As a result, courts cannot be time-sensitive in lawmaking—they cannot make ―sunset laws,‖ nor can they initiate follow-up hearings at the end of a trial period to review the new law.50 Consequently, there are limited options that courts can pursue if they
are to remain part of the lawmaking process.
Notwithstanding, state courts engage extensively in lawmaking in the traditional fields of common law. In view of the
limits on the development of federal common law following the
Erie51 doctrine, and the broad mandate awarded to courts from
an intra-state separation of powers perspective,52 the judicial
development of common law by state courts of last resort continues to stand firm.53
B. THE JUDICIARY AS STATE ACTOR: SHELLEY, SULLIVAN, AND
THEIR AFTERMATH
The general facts and the operative result of the Shelley
case were briefly presented in the Introduction.54 The fate of
the Court‘s precedent in Shelley, which established the tentative doctrine by which any private dispute could be subjected to
constitutional norms once it is brought before a court for resolution, has, perhaps not surprisingly, become practically abandoned.55 Accordingly, both pro-Shelley theories and their criti49. See id. at 915–16.
50. See id.; see also Bruce Adams & Betsy Sherman, Sunset Implementation: A Positive Partnership to Make Government Work, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
78, 78 (1978) (discussing the evolution of sunset laws as a legislative tool).
51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of limits on federal common law, see infra Part I.C.2.
52. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law
Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM.
BUS. L.J. 645, 645 (1996) (arguing that state courts have had numerous occasions in recent years to rethink the development of common law doctrine in
wrongful discharge cases).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.
55. Shelley has not been followed in subsequent Supreme Court and lower
court cases. In numerous instances, courts have refused to apply constitutional norms to various categories of private disputes, even though there was judicial enforcement involved. For a study of post-Shelley case law, see Mark D.
Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 451, 458–70 (2007). For a survey of the ―state action‖ doctrine,
see Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–80 (2010). Shelley was limited to racial discrimination,
and, even within this realm, its holding was practically narrowed to the specif-
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ques seem to focus on individual parties and on whether their
private dealings should be subjected to constitutional principles, or, more generally, on the modern role of the administrative state in private law.56 Whether the court is indeed a
state actor, and what implications this carries, are issues that
seem to have been neglected, probably due to the view that
they are a distraction from the real query: does the public/private distinction still hold?57
ic facts of the case. Only one U.S. Supreme Court case has fully followed Shelley‘s precedent. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 249–60 (1953) (striking
down a state court judgment awarding damages for contractual breach against
a property owner who signed a racially restrictive covenant but then sold the
property to blacks).
56. Thus, to the extent that Shelley adopts an ―attribution rationale,‖ so
that a court cannot enforce substantive provisions that could not have been
enacted in general law because they would have violated constitutional rights,
later decisions have nevertheless enforced such privately made provisions. See
Rosen, supra note 55, at 458. For example, wills conditioning inheritance on
the heir marrying a person of a particular religion were not subjected to the
Establishment Clause merely because a judicial decision enforced these provisions. See Shapira v. Union Nat‘l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827–28 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1974).
57. See Rosen, supra note 55, at 471–72 (noting history of public/private
distinction). Simply put, the post-Shelley courts refused to abolish or otherwise
heavily undermine the public/private distinction. Viewing private parties and
private action as generally immune from direct applicability of constitutional
norms, courts seem to have dismissed the Shelley expansion of the ―state action‖ doctrine to the judicial enforcement of private law as a subterfuge that
may have prevented a morally objectionable result in the Shelley case, but
that could not justify a broader-based curtailment of the private sphere. See
id. (reasoning that the public/private distinction is strongly embedded in
American culture, so that its survival in constitutional doctrine reflects a
strong societal conviction); see also Richard A. Epstein, Classical Liberalism
Meets the New Constitutional Order: A Comment on Mark Tushnet, 3 CHI. J.
INT‘L L. 455, 459–60 (2002) (―The line between public and private action need
not be gutted simply because the equal protection clause applies to some actions of the judiciary.‖). There are, of course, those who seek to justify Shelley
on these grounds exactly. These scholars follow up on the legal realist idea
that private law entrusts individuals with government-backed powers. See,
e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11–14
(1927) (depicting ownership of private property as the exercise of sovereignty
over others with the endorsement of the State). If this is the case, then private
parties cannot hide behind the largely artificial private/public distinction. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505
(1985) (―It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic values—
speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the violator is
a private entity rather than the government.‖). More moderate versions of a
pro-Shelley approach argue that even if constitutional rights should not always govern private legal relationships, constitutional norms can have an
indirect application so that the underlying values of the Constitution would be
adapted to private law doctrines. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the
Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391,

2011]

JUDICIAL LAWMAKING

533

This Section, however, focuses on another aspect of Shelley,
namely the institutional reasoning employed by the Court
throughout its decision. Even if one finds a jurisprudential disconnect in at least one point along the chain of reasoning advanced in Shelley, the case still entails some important observations about the role of courts that are less controversial but
nevertheless nontrivial. This view of courts is further entrenched in Sullivan, discussed below. Thus, once one puts to
the side the conventional-yet-understandable focus on private
parties and private action, the Shelley decision remains highly
instructive as to the way in which a court acts as a state organ
and employs coercive governmental powers in the process. Such
an institutional conceptualization of courts carries substantial
implications, especially when the court is viewed as a lawmaking body, and most notably in the traditional common law field.
Therefore, setting aside the peculiarities of Shelley, it is
probably uncontroversial to argue that when a court engages in
broad-based, future-looking reformulation of common law doctrines, such as in the above-portrayed hypothetical examples of
the adverse possession and equitable right of redemption doctrines, the judicial act should be seen as implicating constitutional review, as would be the case with otherwise comparable
legislative or administrative reforms.58 Taking seriously the
role of the court as a lawmaker requires us to also recognize the
fact that such lawmaking could result in the violation of federal
constitutional rights of present and future parties, what is referred to here as a ―judicial wrong.‖

431– 46 (2008). Others have argued that the public/private distinction loses
much of its power in the era of the ―activist state,‖ which is increasingly committed to publicly enshrining social and economic rights that were once governed by private law. See Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights,
and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 435,
438– 42 (2002); see also Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the
Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1521, 1556–70 (2010) (arguing that ―indirect constitutional effect‖ can be
achieved through common law pathways to better protect ―positive‖ social and
economic rights).
58. See, e.g., Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and
the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 455
(1977) (questioning the constitutionality of congressional attempts to effect
certain policies and programs without resort to piecemeal legislative sanction);
see also Judah A. Shechter, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1483, 1483 (1988) (discussing judicial review of administrative determinations
implicating constitutional rights).
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The Shelley decision quotes the Court‘s previous case law,
noting that
It is doubtless true that a State may act through different agencies,—
either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and
the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of
the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by
one of these agencies or by another.59

When the judiciary acts, so reasons the Shelley decision, a court
employs the ―full coercive power of government.‖60
The Court then goes on to review a number of cases in
which judicial decisions were struck down as a violation of federal constitutional rights, including judicial exclusion of blacks
from jury service by reason of their race or color, failure by
courts to provide the essential ingredients of a fair hearing, and
a finding that a conviction for common law breach of the peace
violated, under the circumstances of the case, the First
Amendment‘s provisions on the freedom of religion.61 While
these precedents dealt with more dispute-specific misconducts
by the judiciary—those ―easy‖ cases of judicial wrongs in which
the court blatantly infringed upon the litigants‘ constitutional
rights—the Shelley Court explicitly expands its analysis to include more ―legitimate‖ forms of state action that may nevertheless violate constitutional rights.62
This was exactly the case in Sullivan, where the Court invalidated Alabama‘s libel law, which provided for an award of
damages for a defamatory falsehood with no requirement of
actual malice, as undercutting the First Amendment whenever
the defamatory publication was directed at the official conduct
of a public official.63 The Court‘s special rule for libel of public
officials, requiring actual malice in such cases, was followed
and is deemed less controversial from the perspective of the
constitutionalization of private conduct.64 This is probably so
59. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S 1, 14 (1948) (quoting Virginia v. Rivers,
100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)).
60. See id. at 19.
61. See id. at 14 –18 (citations omitted).
62. See id. at 8–23.
63. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
64. See, e.g., Curtis Publ‘g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (holding
that the State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
award damages to a ―public figure‖ for defamatory falsehood relating to his
conduct unless verdict is based on actual malice); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 77 (1966) (holding that for purposes of decisional law, under First and
Fourteenth Amendments, a state cannot award damages to a public official for
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the official proves
actual malice).
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because, while the Court later extended this rule to ―public figures,‖65 it refused to apply the rule to private plaintiffs, leaving
this general category of libel cases to state regulation.66
More broadly, Sullivan establishes the principle by which
all government-made laws, including common law rules, may
be subjected to constitutional review. The Court reasoned that
―[i]t matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action
and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute . . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.‖67 The Court in Sullivan thus seemed agnostic
about the question of whether the relevant legal regime is the
result of statutory or judicial lawmaking.68 What is important
is that an authorized actor of the state promulgated a body of
law, and that this public ordering, like all laws, may result in
an infringement of constitutional rights.69
Thus, one uncontroversial component of the legacy of Shelley and Sullivan points to the court as an organ of the state
that engages in the development of legal rules, but one that
may infringe on constitutional rights. This position is taken
again years later in Stop the Beach, when Justice Scalia depicts
the judiciary as an arm of the state that engages in lawmaking
but that is also capable of ―taking‖ property by so doing.70
C. CURRENT LIMITS ON STATE JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
Parts II and III will explore the broader implications that
the above conceptualization of the judiciary could have for federal judicial review of state judicial lawmaking. However, first,
this Section discusses the extent to which state court lawmaking is currently constrained, either by the principle of separation of powers at the state level or by judicial lawmaking at the
federal level.
65. Butts, 388 U.S. at 130–62 (applying the rule to defamatory publications directed at a football coach and a former army general).
66. See Gretz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339– 48 (1974).
67. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 (citations omitted).
68. See id.
69. See id. For a slightly different basis for constitutional review of all
forms of lawmaking, see Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 420 (―[T]he threshold
state action issue is irrelevant wherever a law is challenged as unconstitutional because all laws are subject to the Constitution under the Supremacy
Clause.‖).
70. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2610–13 (2010). For further discussion, see also infra Part II.A.
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1. Intra-State Separation of Powers
The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking should first be evaluated against the state‘s own system of government.71 This is
most prominently so regarding the longstanding concept of separation of powers.72 The way in which this principle is structured in the different states is not simply a miniature version of
the federal conception of the separation of powers.73 There are
substantial differences among the texts of the various state
constitutions in defining the nature and scope of the separation
of powers doctrine.74
The differences among the state constitutions reflect not
only distinctive historical developments, but also varying normative visions about the system of government.75 These attitudes have developed over time in each of the different states,
so that the current equilibrium within each state system is always implicated not only by the state constitutional text, but
also by prevailing public views about the distribution of power.76 Consequently, the states‘ constitutional provisions regarding the separation of powers is not necessarily indicative of the
practical ways in which the different branches, especially the
judiciary, engage in the exercise of powers that belong to other
branches.
71. See G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 329 (2003).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 330.
74. See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of the Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1236–37 (1993). Ten state constitutions
omit any express requirement of the separation of powers, thus following the
federal pattern by which this principle is inferred from the provisions establishing the three branches of government. Twelve constitutions include an
express provision by which the powers are separated, with some of these further stating that exercising powers belonging to another branch is prohibited,
unless otherwise provided elsewhere in the constitution. The remaining state
constitutions couple such an express provision with an additional clause prohibiting any person belonging to or exercising power under any branch from
holding office or exercising any function belonging to another. See id.
75. Many states initially rejected the suspicion of the legislative branch.
See Tarr, supra note 71, at 333–34. During the nineteenth century, however,
numerous states altered their constitutions to guard against an untrammeled
exercise of legislative power. This was not typically done by transferring power
to other branches, but by either transferring some powers directly to the
people or by placing procedural restraints on legislative power, such as by
requiring extraordinary majorities for certain statutes. See id. at 334 – 40.
76. See id. at 340.
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One of the most prominent areas in which judicial state action is viewed as involving substantial policy making and lawmaking, and which is often contested as amounting to undue
judicial activism, is education finance ―adequacy‖ litigation.77
Out of the twenty-six state courts that have engaged in such
adequacy litigation, eight courts refused to engage in merits
review, typically relying on the separation of powers principle
in justifying abstention.78 Eleven state courts approved merits
review, but limited their remedial intervention, so that even if
the legislature‘s education finance scheme was found to violate
state constitutional standards of education quality the legislature could simply construct an alternative funding scheme.79
The final group of seven state courts engaged in the highest
level of judicial involvement, approving the respective trial
courts‘ issuance of policy-directive remedial orders.80
Since most of the normative debate surrounding the legitimacy of the courts‘ engagement in education finance policymaking has focused on the separation-of-powers principle,81 it
is highly instructive to see the way in which this concept plays
out in each of the states. Interestingly, a recent study found no
significant correlation between the relevant text of the state
constitution, specifically whether it includes an explicit or im77. The first wave of education finance litigants in the 1960s and 1970s
relied mostly on Equal Protection arguments, and contended that the allocation of funds discriminated against certain groups or classes. See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugerman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 34, 34 –54 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
The current strategy of education finance litigation focuses on the absolute
―inadequacy‖ of overall public spending on education. See William E. Thro,
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 603–04 (1994). Several scholars have argued, however, that equity theories have far from disappeared in school finance litigation. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (2008) (arguing
that courts continue to focus on whether resources among different school districts are comparable).
78. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 741 (2010).
79. See id. at 742.
80. See id. at 742– 43.
81. For an analysis of this critique against the judicial intervention in
policymaking on allocating the state‘s scarce financial resources, and of potential answers to it, see, for example, Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind:
New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 100, 171–72
(1995).
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plicit provision about the separation of powers, and the actual
level of judicial involvement in education finance.82
These dynamics are also present among state branches of
government in other lawmaking power struggles. Consider, for
example, methodological rules of statutory interpretation, and
whether state courts, in reading a statute, should follow a ―textualist‖ approach, a ―purposive‖ approach, or a different methodology.83 Although just about every state legislature has codified rules of statutory interpretation, many state courts have
practically refused to apply these rules.84 Instead, state courts
have come up with their own methodological rules of statutory
interpretation.85
These findings do not indicate, however, that the separation of powers principle is simply being ridiculed or ignored by
state courts in carving out their lawmaking authority. Rather,
this tension points to the fact that the allocation of powers is
constantly debated as a major feature of the system of government, and that the equilibrium of lawmaking powers varies
from state to state while also changing over time within each
state system.86
Once again, the field of law that emerges as the least controversial one from a state separation-of-powers perspective,
and in which judicial lawmaking is deemed legitimate even
when it implicates core policy considerations, is that of traditional common law.
A leading example is the doctrine of implied warranty of
habitability, which has been a major pillar in the landlord82. See Bauries, supra note 78, at 743– 46. Legislatures have typically
responded to ―judicial activism‖ with hostility and foot-dragging, thus practically continuing the power struggle over norm-making. See Ryan, supra note
77, at 1241 (describing such dynamics in New Jersey).
83. The scholarly debate about rules of statutory interpretation traditionally focuses on federal law—where, in effect, no agreed methodological rules
exist. This leads state legal systems to engage in their own jurisprudential
rules. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J.
1750, 1824 –29 (2010).
84. See id. (contending that while some courts simply avoid applying legislative interpretative rules, other courts forthrightly refuse to apply such
rules).
85. Id. at 1829– 46. Gluck argues that this judicial methodological approach is often strikingly similar from state to state. Gluck labels this emerging approach as one of ―modified textualism.‖ Id.
86. See id. at 1826–28 (noting that there is a power struggle between the
judicial and legislative branch about which branch will control methodological
choice).
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tenant law reform introduced by courts in the District of Columbia in the 1960s and 1970s, and consequently followed in
the majority of states.87 In the leading case, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,88 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
declared that ―[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines
in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life—
particularly old common law doctrines which the courts themselves created and developed,‖89 and reasoned that ―[t]he continued validity of the common law . . . depends upon its ability
to reflect contemporary community values and ethics.‖90 Treating a lease as a contract, the court read an implied warranty of
quality into the lease.91 This reading parted ways with the archaic assumption that the tenant can feasibly make all necessary repairs,92 and focused instead on protecting the ―legitimate
expectations of the buyer.‖93
The court-made doctrine of implied warranty of habitability was quickly adopted by almost all states.94 In some states,
the courts have reformulated their common law to accommodate the new principle, while in other states the warranty was
codified by statute.95 While the specific scope and terms of the
warranty may change from state to state,96 whenever the warranty is applied to residential properties it cannot be waived by

87. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Modern Status of Rules as to Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for Use of Leased Premises, 40 A.L.R.3D 646 (1971) (discussing the development of the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability).
88. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 1074.
90. Id. (quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C.
Cir. 1960)).
91. See id. at 1077–83.
92. Id. at 1074. The court reasons that this assumption may have been
reasonable in a rural-agrarian society, but that for the modern apartment
dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live, which includes ―not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.‖ Id.
93. Id. at 1075.
94. See 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN
ON LEASES § 10:1.2, n.21 (5th ed. 2004).
95. See id. Such codification has taken place, for example, in Texas, California, Minnesota, and North Carolina. Id.
96. For example, a few jurisdictions also apply the warranty to commercial properties, though the majority of states restrict the warranty to residential use. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 448 (2006).
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agreement.97 This makes this judicial reform one endowed with
a thick layer of social policy design.
Although the doctrine was initially codified in some states,
this does not derogate from the fact that courts have been generally viewed across all states as authorized to extensively engage in lawmaking in this field. A chief argument made in Part
IV is that the contemporary landscape of common law doctrines
often employs a mixed strategy of lawmaking, so that promotion of reforms takes place through legislation and judicial action. Courts thus maintain their legitimacy to engage in lawmaking in traditional common law doctrines even in the ―age of
statutes.‖98 From an intra-state separation of powers view,
courts are retaining substantive lawmaking authority in crafting common law doctrines.
2. The Scope of Federal Judicial Preemption
At times, federal lawmaking trumps state judicial lawmaking. Since this issue is not unique to the state judiciary, but applies to any type of state lawmaking, I will touch briefly on one
topic that would be of special interest in the judicial lawmaking
context. In studying the plethora of issues that may create a
tension between federal and state lawmaking, common law
once again emerges as striking a distinctive balance between
federal and state powers, while primarily implicating the judiciaries on both levels.
The point of departure is the U.S. Supreme Court‘s seminal
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.99 In Erie, the Court
held that state common law governs federal diversity cases,
famously stating that ―[t]here is no general federal common
law.‖100 The Court based its decision on several constitutional
principles, including the Equal Protection Clause (fearing disparate treatment based on the litigants‘ state citizenship),101
and ideas of federalism enshrined chiefly in the Tenth Amendment, so that substantive rules of common law relevant to the

97. See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 94, § 10:1.4 (reasoning that
the this rule is ―based on a public policy affecting poor tenants who have no
choice but to move into premises in a deplorable condition‖).
98. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
passim (1982); see also infra Part IV.B.
99. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
100. Id. at 78.
101. See id. at 74 –75.
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case were a matter ―reserved by the Constitution to the several
states.‖102
The legacy of Erie has been controversial as a matter of
both doctrine and theory. This dispute will not be analyzed
here,103 but it is important to note that in the context of Erie,
the term ―federal common law‖ consists of ―federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands.‖104 This means that the Erie doctrine places federal
courts at the heart of the constraints imposed on the federal
government. Congress can effectively enter into new realms of
federal ordering in traditional common law issues by resorting
to the Constitution‘s provisions in Article 1, § 8, most notably
those of the Commerce Clause.105 Federal courts do not have a
similar constitutional mandate.106 Therefore, federal courts
cannot regularly intervene in state judicial lawmaking in their
own judicial lawmaking capacity.107 Federal courts, and most
prominently the Supreme Court, could thus step in chiefly in
their judicial review capacity, when state judicial lawmaking
violates the protections of the Federal Constitution.108
In summary, judicial lawmaking by state courts, who are
acting as state actors, remains an important phenomenon even
102. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
103. Doctrinally, federal common law seems to be constantly expanding,
even though the Court rarely admits to doing so outside of the established
―enclaves,‖ such as cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United
States, disputes between states, international relations, and admiralty. However, despite this ―crawling‖ effect, the development of the core of common law
fields generally remains within the states. See generally Jay Tidmarsh &
Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585
(2006).
104. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003).
105. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For an analysis of the cunning history of
the use of the Commerce Clause to increase Congressional regulatory power,
see generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).
106. In an interesting development, a number of commentators have read
Erie to represent not only a concept of federalism, but also one of separation of
powers, which broadly prevents the federal judiciary from engaging in judicial
policy making and lawmaking unless authorized to do so by the Constitution
or by Congress. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). Others have dubbed this
new reading of Erie as merely a myth. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s
Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 619–20 (2008) (arguing it is practically impossible to differentiate common law from statutory or constitutional interpretation, remedial law, and other ―non-common-law‖ judicial decision-making).
107. See Clark, supra note 106, at 1403–04.
108. See id. at 1413.
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in the contemporary era of the administrative State. Along with
the power to engage in lawmaking, however, is the potential to
infringe on legally enshrined individual rights. Thus, the chief
challenge for the U.S. Supreme Court, acting in its judicial review capacity, is how to assess such state judicial lawmaking
when a potential ―judicial wrong‖ exists. Part II starts this inquiry by discussing how the Court has addressed one such instance, that of a ―judicial taking.‖
II. STOP THE BEACH AND THE CONCEPT OF A
JUDICIAL WRONG
This Part offers a close reading of the Stop the Beach case.
After briefly mapping out the different opinions, it explicates on
how Justice Scalia‘s invocation of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine
and Justice Kennedy‘s application of the Due Process Clause
implicate the limits of judicial lawmaking but nevertheless
leave many central issues unresolved.
A. INTRODUCING THE JUDICIAL TAKING DOCTRINE
In Stop the Beach, the Court reviewed the constitutional
validity of a decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court,
in which the latter replied in the negative to the following
question, certified to it by the state‘s Court of Appeal: ―On its
face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just
compensation?‖109 The petitioner argued that the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision in itself amounted to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.110
All eight participating Supreme Court Justices held that
no such constitutional violation had occurred in this case.111
While four Justices, in a decision authored by Justice Scalia,
explicitly recognized that under certain circumstances a judicial decision could amount to an unconstitutional taking of
property—thus creating a new doctrine of ―judicial taking‖112—
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg left ―for another day‖ the general
question of if, and when, a judicial taking could take place.113
109. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct 2592, 2600 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2596; id. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2619 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2608 ( plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg joined the
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Under the common law in Florida, the state owns in trust
for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, i.e., the land between the lowtide line and the mean high-water line.114 Littoral property
owners have certain unique rights with regard to the water and
the foreshore.115 These rights include the right of access to the
water, the right to use the water for certain purposes, the right
to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive
accretions and relictions (referred to jointly as ―accretions‖ by
the Court).116 Accretion is a slow, gradual process, by which
lands once covered by water become dry when the water recedes. Under common law, littoral owners take title to these
lands.117
The Florida common law provides for a different rule for
the process of avulsion, a ―sudden or perceptible loss to or addition to land by the action of the water . . . .‖118 In the case of
avulsion, formerly submerged land that has become dry land
continues to belong to the owner of the seabed, which in Florida
is the state.119 Thus, the boundary between littoral property
and sovereign land remains the same: the mean high-water
land before the event.120
In 1961, Florida‘s legislature passed the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act (the Act),121 which established procedures for
―beach restoration and renourishment projects,‖ and was designed to deposit land on eroded beaches and to maintain the
deposited land.122 Under the Act, once a beach restoration
project is approved and undertaken, the relevant state agency
establishes an ―erosion control line,‖ which is set in reference to
the existing mean high-water line.123 The fixed erosion-control
line then replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the
boundary between privately owned littoral property and state
property.124 This means that once the erosion-control line is
opinion. Id. at 2618.
114. Id. at 2597–99 ( plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 2598 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 2594.
117. Id. at 2598.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 2598–99.
120. Id. at 2599.
121. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§161.011–.45 (West 2006).
122. Id. § 161.088.
123. Id. § 161.161(3)–(5).
124. Id. § 161.191(1).
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recorded, the common law ceases to increase upland property
by accretion.125 The landowners continue to be entitled, however, ―to all common-law riparian rights,‖ except for the right to
accretions.126
Littoral owners in the City of Destin and Walton County
challenged a restoration project, aimed at adding seventy-five
feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line, arguing
that the project takes their right to receive accretions to their
property.127 The District Court of Appeal accepted their claim,
which argued that the project would ―unreasonably infringe on
riparian rights,‖ and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
broader question of the unconstitutionality of the Act.128 The
Florida Supreme Court answered in the negative, faulting the
District Court of Appeal for not considering the doctrine of
avulsion, and describing the right to accretion as a future contingent interest rather than a vested property right.129
While the U.S. Supreme Court depicted the right to accretion as one to which the Fifth Amendment would apply if the
state took the right, it agreed with the Florida Supreme Court
that the doctrine of avulsion also applies to state-created avulsions made as part of restoration and renourishment projects
under the Act.130 The Court thus concluded that the judicial
decision was consistent with the background principles of state
property law.131 But although all Justices agreed in the judgment, they significantly departed on the general question of
judicial takings.
Briefly, Justice Scalia made the argument that the Takings
Clause has traditionally applied to state actions beyond the
―classic‖ eminent domain, including state regulations that deprive the property owner of ―all economically beneficial
uses,‖132 and the re-characterization as public property of what
125. Id. § 161.191(2).
126. Id. § 161.201.
127. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2600 (2010). The littoral owners also argued that the project
would take away their right ―to have the contact of their property with the
water remain intact.‖ Id. The Court addressed this argument and rejected it.
Id.
128. Id. at 2600–02.
129. Id. at 2600–01.
130. Id. at 2612.
131. Id. at 2610–13.
132. Id. at 2601 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992)).
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was previously private property.133 Based on the language of
the Fifth Amendment and on ―common sense,‖ Scalia reasoned
that the Takings Clause ―is not addressed to the action of a
specific branch or branches.‖134 It would be absurd, according to
Scalia, ―to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.‖135 Further, ―[the
Court‘s] precedents provide no support for the proposition that
takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special
treatment, and in fact suggest to the contrary,‖136 so that ―the
particular state actor is irrelevant.‖137 The test for a ―judicial
taking,‖ in the context of this case, is thus formulated by Justice Scalia as follows: ―If a legislature or a court declares that
what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State
had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by
regulation.‖138
In a brief separate opinion, Justice Breyer deemed it best
to leave ―for another day‖ the broader constitutional issues
raised by the plurality opinion.139 The chief concern of Justice
Breyer is one of gate-flooding. Since ―losing parties in many
state-court cases may well believe that the erroneous judicial
decisions have deprived them of property rights they previously
held and may consequently bring federal takings claims,‖ then
―the approach the plurality would take today threatens to open
the federal doors to constitutional review of any, perhaps large
numbers of, state-law cases in an area of law familiar to state,
but not federal, judges.‖140 Federal judges might therefore find
themselves, according to Breyer, playing ―a major role in the
shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property
law.‖141
Justice Kennedy, in his separate opinion, did not affirmatively hold that a ―judicial taking‖ could or could not ever occur.142 But he did voice strong concerns about simply extending
133. See id. (citing Webb‘s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 163–65 (1980)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2601–02.
137. Id. at 2602.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2619.
141. Id. at 2618–19. This issue will be taken up further in Part III.B.3.
142. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the Takings Clause to judicial decisions.143 Kennedy expressed
doubt regarding the legitimacy of courts to engage in the taking
of property, viewing this power as belonging to the political
branches, i.e., the legislative and executive that are accountable in their political capacity for exercising such power.144 Judicial elimination of an established property right could thus
amount to a violation of due process.145 Although Kennedy remained somewhat obscure about the nature of the due process
violation, his general point was that, since the recognition of
judicial takings would in effect legitimize the power of courts to
engage in takings, the Due Process Clause146 is the more appropriate channel to address potential encroachments by the
judiciary on the power granted to the political branches.147 At
the same time, Kennedy validated the legitimacy of state courts
to make incremental changes to property rights without this
implicating the Constitution148—a point that Scalia rejects as a
practical mandate for uncompensated deprivations of established rights.149
B. DUE PROCESS, TAKINGS, AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
LAWMAKING
This Section discusses three focal points of the Court‘s
analysis in Stop the Beach. First, it frames the controversy between the Justices following Kennedy‘s suggestion that resort
to the Due Process Clause is the appropriate channel for addressing judicial violation of property rights, while locating incremental changes to common law property rights as falling
outside constitutional protection. Second, it analyzes the way in
which Scalia and Kennedy differ in their depiction of courts as
either a more trustworthy or a more suspect state actor in the
context of takings. Third, this Section takes up the debate of
whether the mere recognition of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine
actually endows state courts with more power to take property.
Evaluating these three themes, it seems that Justice Scalia
has the better argument in the Due Process debate. The second
143. Id. at 2615.
144. Id. at 2613–16.
145. Id. at 2615.
146. While not explicitly saying so, Justice Kennedy seems to refer to the
Fifth Amendment‘s and the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clauses as
one. See, e.g., id. at 2614. I will follow the same course in my analysis.
147. Id. at 2613–16.
148. Id. at 2615.
149. Id. at 2606–07 ( plurality opinion).
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topic, the institutional comparison between courts and legislatures, remains very much underdeveloped by both Justices. Finally, Justice Kennedy‘s reasoning seems to prevail regarding
the debate about the broader implications of the judicial taking
doctrine. This leads to an odd result, by which neither of the
opinions standing alone develops a coherent analysis of the
proper mode of federal judicial review of state judicial lawmaking. This is a gap that I aim at closing in the following Parts.
To begin, one might initially read Justice Scalia‘s opinion
as representing jurisprudential ―novelty,‖ with Justice Kennedy
offering a more ―cautious‖ approach. But Kennedy‘s analysis of
the Due Process Clause reveals a strict approach toward state
courts, which is in fact reactionary to contemporary conceptions
of judicial lawmaking. In reasoning that courts ―are not designed to make policy decisions about ‗the need for, and likely
effectiveness of, regulatory actions‘‖150 and that ―[t]he usual due
process constraint is that courts cannot abandon settled principles,‖151 Kennedy‘s position seems far from representing
longstanding practices of courts, especially in common law
fields.
As Part I has shown, state (and federal) courts have long
engaged in core policy decisions in reforming common law doctrines, such as by introducing the implied warranty of habitability with its strong regulatory feature.152 And as is well
known, the stare decisis principle has never been an insurmountable barrier for courts, when changing needs and times
have justified, in their view, the overruling of precedents.153
In fact, the position that stood as the basis of the Court‘s
formerly suspicious approach toward the doctrine of judicial
takings is directly contrary to Justice Kennedy‘s viewpoint. In
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, which rejected
the notion of a judicial taking, Justice Brandeis famously
stated:
The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform with changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts
administrating the common law. Since it is for the state courts to in150. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 88–97.
153. See EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 104 – 45. For an analysis of the plethora of instances in which courts have often overruled or otherwise overturned common-law precedents, see id. at 145 (reasoning that ―overruling,
inconsistent distinguishing, and other forms of overturning do not necessarily
involve discontinuity‖).
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terpret and declare the law of the State, it is for them to correct their
errors and declare what the law has been as well as what it is. State
courts, like this Court, may ordinarily overrule their own decisions
without offending constitutional guaranties, even though parties may
have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the earlier decisions.154

Controversial as Justice Brandeis‘s opinion is, as it completely shields judicial lawmaking from federal constitutional
constraints, while subjecting similar legislative and administrative ―trial and error‖ lawmaking to constitutional scrutiny,155 Justice Kennedy goes to the other extreme. Justice Kennedy does so by automatically applying the Due Process Clause
to invalidate any judicial decision that would ―eliminate or
change established property rights‖156 in the process of reforming a common law doctrine, viewing it as an illegitimate exercise of an authority that belongs to the other branches.157
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion is even more puzzling in view of
his statement that ―[s]tate courts generally operate under a
common-law tradition that allows for incremental modifications
to property law.‖158 This means that while ―incremental modifications‖ would not at all implicate constitutional concerns, once
the court ―eliminates or substantially changes established
property rights‖ the Due Process Clause would invalidate such
a decision as ―arbitrary or irrational,‖ meaning simply unauthorized in Kennedy‘s view.159
But drawing the line between incremental modifications
and elimination or substantial change to property rights is far
from a simple, straightforward task. Accordingly, delineating
the contours of illegitimate or unauthorized judicial action is
much trickier than what Justice Kennedy portrays. Needless to
say, the regulatory takings doctrine has been such a muddle
exactly because it may be extremely difficult to distinguish a
constitutional violation from a no-violation scenario when a
154. 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930).
155. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449,
1466–67 (1990) (explaining that Brandeis‘s opinion in Brinkerhoff-Faris puts
judicial lawmaking in a separate category from legislative and administrative
agencies and noting that Brandeis, in dicta, stated that state court changes to
the common law were not subject to constitutional restrictions, unlike actions
by legislative and administrative agencies).
156. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. See id. (―If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or
the legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could
be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law.‖).
158. Id. at 2615.
159. Id.
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governmental entity takes a certain action that adversely affects property rights.160 Thus, in view of the infeasibility of the
all-or-nothing approach that Justice Kennedy advances, Justice
Scalia seems to be on stronger footing in arguing that takings
jurisprudence, with its built-in nuances, cannot simply be
deemed irrelevant for reviewing the entire spectrum of common
law decisions that impact property rights.161
A second point of contention between Scalia and Kennedy
concerns the nature of the judiciary and its potential propensity
to violate constitutional rights. The debate here is extremely
brief and lacking, mainly because it is conducted on entirely different levels.
Justice Kennedy‘s position is that a court basically engages
in institutional usurpation when it ―eliminates or substantially
changes established property rights.‖162 In contrast, Justice
Scalia follows the more conventional rationales for constitutional scrutiny, saying that Kennedy‘s ―injection of separationof-powers principles into the Due Process Clause would also
have the ironic effect of preventing the assignment of the expropriation function to the branch of government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of individual rights.‖163
This least-dangerous-branch argument by Scalia thus legitimizes the power of courts to engage in lawmaking, without exempting them from constitutional review in case of an alleged
violation of rights.164
It is, however, unclear if courts are indeed categorically
less prone to violate constitutional rights, such as the right of
private property, in their lawmaking functions. In his 1990 article on judicial takings, Barton Thompson argues that in con160. See William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections
of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433–38, 481–85 (2005) (explaining the difficulty of distinguishing between government regulatory actions—which are rarely considered takings—and government appropriations,
which are always considered a taking). See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561
(1984) (analyzing approaches to takings and stating that one of the most difficult property issues is deciding when certain government actions constitute a
taking).
161. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606 ( plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 2605 ( plurality opinion).
164. See id. at 2605–08 (explaining that the judicial branch is the ―most
protective of individual rights‖ and stating that the Court ―must not say that
we are bound by the Constitution never to sanction judicial elimination of
clearly established property rights‖).
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sidering rights-oriented rationales (e.g., the right not to be
coerced, or the right not to share an unjustifiably large portion
of public costs), and process-oriented rationales (e.g., the risk of
demoralization costs of uncompensated takings, fear of political
discrimination against property owners, or the problem of ―fiscal illusion‖),165 one cannot assume that courts will be entirely
protective of individual rights, or that affected parties will consider courts as protective even when they are on the losing
side.166 Thompson thus sees no overarching justification for releasing courts from constitutional property review.167 Whatever
conclusion one may reach in this institutional comparison, Justice Scalia‘s statement offers little guidance as to the specific
characteristics of the Court‘s review of state court decisions implicating private property, as compared with federal review of
legislative and administrative decisions.168
Finally, Justices Scalia and Kennedy diverge on whether
recognizing a ―judicial taking‖ doctrine would in itself empower
courts to engage in such types of actions. According to Kennedy, ―[b]ut were this Court to say that judicial decisions become
takings when they overreach, this might give more power to
courts, not less.‖169 If a court ―decide[s] that enacting a sweeping new rule to adjust the rights of property owners in the context of changing social needs is a good idea,‖ Kennedy predicts
that ―[k]nowing that the resulting ruling would be a taking, the
courts could go ahead with their project, free from constraints
that would otherwise confine their power.‖170 Consequently, ―a
State might find itself obligated to pay a substantial judgment

165. For these different rationales, see Thompson, supra note 155, at 1472–
98.
166. Id. at 1495–97 (explaining that there are imperfections to judicial
decision making in property law).
167. See id. at 1472–1512 (stating the importance of judicial review of
property decisions).
168. See Mitch L. Walter, Comment, From Background Principles to Bright
Lines: Justice Scalia and the Conservative Bloc of the U.S. Supreme Court
Attempt to Change the Law of Property as We Know It [Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010)], 50 WASHBURN L.J. 799, 822 (2010) (concluding that Justice
Scalia did not deny that barring federal courts from reviewing state court decisions would ―result in a flood of takings claims coming directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court‖ but did not address this concern nor did he address Justice
Kennedy‘s ―remedy-oriented concerns,‖ resulting in little specific guidance on
the Court‘s judicial review of such decisions).
169. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170. Id.
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for the judicial ruling.‖171 Justice Scalia replies that this would
not be the case: ―[I]f we were to hold that the Florida Supreme
Court had effected an uncompensated taking in this case, we
would not validate the taking by ordering Florida to pay compensation. We would simply reverse the . . . judgment.‖172 As a
result, ―[t]he power to effect a compensated taking would then
reside, where it has always resided . . . in the Florida Legislature—which could either provide compensation or acquiesce in
the invalidity of the offending features of the Act.‖173
It is true that the Court could choose among different remedies in addressing a judicial-taking scenario.174 But in some
sense, Justice Scalia‘s approach, by which the state judicial
lawmaking would practically become non est factum, is simply
unrealistic.
Scalia‘s suggested remedy of simply reversing the state
judicial action would itself have the ―ironic effect of preventing
the assignment of the expropriation function to the branch of
government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of
individual rights.‖175 By refusing to validate such a judicial act
and ordering payment of just compensation, Scalia reaches the
exact same result that Kennedy is trying to achieve by using
the Due Process doctrine—i.e., ruling that a court is in effect
unauthorized to engage in a taking.176 In so doing, Scalia deviates from the Court‘s conventional understanding of the Takings Clause, which ―does not bar government from interfering
with property rights, but rather requires compensation in the
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.‖177
In this sense Justice Kennedy has the better argument in suggesting that formally introducing a ―judicial taking‖ doctrine
has the inevitable effect of enabling courts to engage in the restructuring of property rights.178
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2607 ( plurality opinion).
173. Id.
174. See Thompson, supra note 155, at 1514 –21 (suggesting an array of
remedies).
175. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2605.
176. See id. at 2613–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining why the court
should not recognize a judicial takings doctrine).
177. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (quoting First
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987)).
178. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2615–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that recognizing a judicial takings doctrine would give more power
to courts to do what they want with property rights).

552

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:520

We are thus left with a rather odd state of events, by which
neither of the opinions standing alone formulates a coherent
theory of judicial deprivation of property rights. More broadly,
the Justices leave open crucial questions about the proper jurisprudential framework for federal judicial review of state
judicial wrongs in general. Part III takes up the challenge of
conceptualizing such a model of ―judicial review of judicial
lawmaking.‖
III. THE NEXT STEP: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
This Part addresses the core issue that arises from Stop the
Beach but that has not been adequately conceptualized by the
different opinions—namely, how should the legal system construct a model for federal judicial review of state judicial lawmaking?
A. NO ―SPECIAL TREATMENT‖?
It is now time to frame the main conclusions reached so far
in the broader context of ―judicial wrongs‖ and the judicial review thereof. State courts have significant, well-established
powers to engage in lawmaking, especially in common law doctrines.179 In so doing, they act as full-fledged state actors, exercising the ―full coercive power of government.‖180 Such lawmaking is often considered perfectly legitimate from the state perspective of separation of powers, and when common law is concerned, state courts would hardly be constrained by federal
judicial lawmaking. At the same time, state courts should be
held accountable for potential violations of federal constitutional rights, even if these occur as a byproduct of otherwise benign
judicial reform. These assumptions in place, how should such
lawmaking be affected by federal judicial review, compared
with legislative or regulatory lawmaking? Should judicial lawmaking that may result in a judicial wrong indeed receive no
―special treatment‖? For this purpose, consider the two hypothetical judicial actions presented in the Introduction.

179. See generally Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of Federal Courts,
12 PACE L. REV. 263, 265–73 (1992) (discussing the history of common law
lawmaking).
180. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
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1. The Adverse Possession Reform
First, consider the judicial reform of the state adverse possession doctrine, eliminating the requirement by which the
possession has to be ―continuous for the statutory period,‖181 an
element that had been set up in previous state case law.182
What could the potential federal constitutional impact be, and
how should judicial review assess this state ruling?
This new rule probably cannot be seen as a full-scale taking of a landowner‘s ―stick‖ of ownership.183 The right to bring
an action against a trespasser has not been abolished,184 and
there is no objective threshold of a minimal continuous period
of possession.185 This is especially so because the overall periods of the statutes of limitations vary widely from state to
state, from five to forty years.186 So, if the statute of limitations
establishes an overall twenty year period, and the court rules
that this timeframe could be divided into consecutive possessions of five years each by the same adverse possessor for an
overall period of twenty years, it is unclear if the owner‘s rights
have been objectively deprived.187 At the same time, this reform
does derogate to some extent, at least in theory, from the
landowner‘s ―bundle.‖188
Such a judicial reform could thus be challenged as a potential ―regulatory taking‖ case that should be seemingly governed
by the three-prong test created in Penn Central Transportation
181. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 150–51
(2d ed. 2005) (explaining the ―continuous‖ element of adverse possession).
182. For this element, and the doctrine in general, see Part IV.A and infra
text accompanying notes 305–08.
183. For cases holding that the uncompensated deprivation of one of the
―sticks‖ of a property ―bundle‖ would amount to a taking, see, e.g., Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (reasoning that ―the right to pass on‖ property
is ―itself a valuable right‖); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982) ( portraying the power to exclude as ―one of the
most treasured strands in an owner‘s bundle of property rights‖).
184. See SINGER, supra note 181, at 143 (explaining that the owner can
bring an action for ejectment against a non-owner).
185. See id. at 150 (explaining that the continuity period depends on the
statute of limitation determined by the state).
186. See id. at 157 ( listing the statutory periods in various states).
187. See id. at 151 (explaining that a person can adversely possess property
for less than the period required by the statute of limitations if there are succeeding periods of possession called tacking); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 121 (stating that entry must be continuous for the statutory
period, but not necessarily constant).
188. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 83 (describing property as a
―bundle‖ of rights); SINGER, supra note 181, at 142 (describing the legal rights
of owners in the context of adverse possession).
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Co. v. City of New York, which requires a weighing of (1) ―the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;‖ (2) ―the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;‖ and (3) ―the character of the
governmental action.‖189
In comparing review of a regulatory taking case to that of
an otherwise identical legislation or regulation, the first two
prongs would seem largely unaffected by the potential peculiarity of the reviewed judicial action. The first prong deals with a
quantitative component of the economic loss, while the second
deals with the property owner‘s past investments and consequent expectations against the background of the former legal
regime.190
The third prong might result in a slightly more awkward
test in the context of a potential ―judicial regulatory taking.‖ In
Penn Central, Justice Brennan explains the ―character of the
governmental action‖ by saying that a taking ―may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.‖191
One could understand the latter part of this statement as evaluating the underlying motivation of the governmental branch
as either publicly benign or as self-serving, or as Steven Eagle
suggested, as looking into the ―worthiness‖ of the government‘s
regulatory purpose.192
This is, however, not the conventional reading of this
prong. In analyzing the third Penn Central prong in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,193 the Court seemed to
focus on the distinction between a permanent invasion and a
regulation as the litmus test for the prong.194 Moreover, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court reasoned that takings ju189. 438 U.S. 104, 124 –25 (1978).
190. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use
Regulation, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1249–56 (2009) (analyzing the first two
prongs).
191. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
192. Steven J. Eagle, “Character ” as “Worthiness”: A New Meaning for
Penn Central’s Third Test?, 27 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2004) (explaining that the ―character test‖ would consider the motivation and circumstances
of the regulator).
193. For the Court‘s holding, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432–38 (1982) (discussing the distinction between permanent occupation and a temporary invasion).
194. Id. at 426–27.
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risprudence focuses on the ―magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property
rights‖ or on ―how any regulatory burden is distributed among
property owners,‖ but it does not question the legitimacy of the
goal that the governmental body seeks to promote.195 Such inquiry is located rather within the realm of substantive due
process jurisprudence.196
It is indeed under a substantive due process test that the
judicial review of the judicial lawmaking encounters genuine
conceptual difficulty. In the early twentieth century, the Court
looked at whether the governmental regulation was ―clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.‖197 In the
Court‘s contemporary language in Lingle, ―[t]he ‗substantially
advances‘ formula suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in
achieving some legitimate public purpose.‖198
Consider therefore a potential substantive due process
challenge to the adverse possession judicial reform. One argument could be that even if the ―growing need to use lands more
efficiently‖199 is a legitimate public purpose,200 increasing the
scope of immunity to trespassers by shortening the period for
consecutive possessions is not an effective means to achieve
such an end. Adverse possessions are piecemeal, anecdotal, and
lack any sort of coordinated action to ensure the more efficient
allocation of lands.201
So how is the federal reviewing court to inspect the constitutionality of the state judicial reform under a substantive due
process argument? The Court in Lingle, in warning against the
expansion of the ―substantially advances‖ formula to takings
jurisprudence, reasoned that a heightened means-ends review
of regulation ―would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of
195. 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
196. See id.
197. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
198. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
199. See supra text accompanying note 23.
200. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89
GEO. L.J. 2419, 2435–36 (2001) (discussing the notion that adverse possession
does not always serve the public purpose of putting land to productive use or
encouraging certain behaviors from landowners).
201. See id. (explaining that adverse possession does not always result in
the more efficient use of lands because the risk of adverse possession creates
an incentive to monitor one‘s property, not necessarily an incentive to use the
land productively).
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a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which
courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—and
might often require—courts to substitute their predictive
judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.‖202 This explains, per the Court, why ―we have long
eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation.‖203
Should the Court, in its judicial review capacity, exercise
such a careful approach to judicial reforms? Should it indeed
refrain from substituting its ―predictive judgments‖ for those of
the state court, which initiated the reform in its role as a common law norm-maker? Alternatively, a case could be made for
approaching this problem in a completely different manner: If
courts are not well suited to evaluate ends and the means to
attain them, the judicial reviewer should not defer at all to the
judicial lawmaker. This is because both courts are located in
exactly the same (inferior) position to evaluate the prospects
and perils of such a reform. While the state court obviously has
a more intimate acquaintance with the social and economic
background of the specific state—a point I address in detail in
Part III.B below—one could argue that this does not necessarily indicate inherent superiority of the state court in analyzing
means-ends congruence or in assessing the reform‘s implications on the Constitution.
2. The Equitable Redemption Reform
Consider now the second hypothetical scenario, in which a
state court of last resort revises the equitable right of redemption so as to adjust to contemporary circumstances the original
purpose of this right, i.e., protecting homeowners who had formerly defaulted on their mortgage but who had once again become solvent and now wish to avoid the harsh consequences of
being evicted under a strict application of the foreclosure procedure.
Viewing this right as designed to protect typically less
well-to-do homeowners who encountered financial difficulties,
but not to enable lenders to strategically exercise a legal option
to make payments based on more general market conditions,
the state court decides that the doctrine should be somewhat
reframed. Created by English equity courts hundreds of years
202. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
203. Id. at 545.
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ago, the doctrine must now be reevaluated ―in order to conform
with changing ideas and conditions.‖204
To achieve this need while providing clear legal guidance
to future lenders and borrowers, the state court holds that the
doctrine would now generally apply only to homeowners who
live below the federal poverty line or who own no other real
property.
What could be the potential grounds for federal judicial review, and in what way, if any, would such a review be distinguishable from a constitutional assessment of an otherwise
identical reform that would have been passed by the state‘s legislature?
One potential constitutional argument suggests that
homeowner-debtors who no longer enjoy the equitable redemption right under the new regime have had one of their property
―sticks‖ taken without just compensation in violation of the
Takings Clause. The test would thus simply follow Justice Scalia‘s formulation of the judicial-taking case, where the court
ruled ―that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists.‖205 Even if the state court acknowledges
that it has changed the common law, the dispute would nevertheless entangle the debate between Justices Scalia and Kennedy on whether the judicial reform introduces only ―incremental changes,‖ and even if so, whether such a change would avoid
implicating the Takings Clause.206
A different potential basis for constitutional review, the
claim that the new judicial norm implicates the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause, reveals more vividly
the peculiarities of federally reviewing the state court‘s alleged
―judicial wrong.‖207 Should federal judicial review of such a
204. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8
(1930).
205. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
206. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
207. Interestingly, in Shelley, the Court held the state court to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause not for changing the law, but quite the
opposite, for simply maintaining settled state common law principles enforcing
the privately drafted restrictive covenant. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21–
23 (1948). But, most likely, potential challenges to state common law jurisprudence would look more like the equitable redemption example, such that a
shift in the common law would arguably unconstitutionally differentiate
among classes of persons. In the example before us, the new delineation of the
doctrine could be contested as an affirmative-action-type discrimination made
on the basis of socioeconomic status.
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state judicial lawmaking follow the three-tiered Equal Protection framework designed for assessing legislation or regulation?208 If this is the case, the equitable redemption example
would thus fall under ―rational basis‖ review, the most deferential tier of review, since wealth is generally considered to be a
non-suspect class under the holding in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.209
Notwithstanding slight varieties in the application of the
rational basis test,210 the test is seen as materially different
from the ―strict scrutiny‖211 or ―intermediate scrutiny‖212 tiers
of review, because of the view that under ordinary circumstances, judicial review ―is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.‖213
The dilemma about applying the ―rational basis‖ standard
of review to judicial lawmaking is in many respects reminiscent of the debate about the application of the substantive due
process ―substantially advances‖ formula to the adverse possession judicial reform.214 In both instances, the Court reasons
that it is not in a position, in its judicial review capacity, to eva208. The three tiers of judicial scrutiny of government actions which are
claimed to infringe the Equal Protection Clause are rational basis review (the
most lenient type of review), intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. See
infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
209. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
210. The conventional analysis of this tier gives the reviewed classification
a ―strong presumption of validity,‖ emphasizing that rational basis review
does not authorize the judiciary to ―sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.‖ Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
( per curiam)). A more demanding version, articulated in a few cases, requires
that ―the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation.‖ F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920). For a discussion of these ―weak‖ and ―strong‖ versions of rational basis
review, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
481, 512–18 (2004).
211. ―Strict scrutiny‖ relates to classifications based on race or national
origin. To pass constitutional muster, the suspect classification ―must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be ‗necessary . . . to the
accomplishment‘ of their legitimate purpose.‖ Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
432–33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
212. Courts apply ―intermediate scrutiny‖ review to classifications based on
gender. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Within this middle tier, the
classification ―must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.‖ Id.
213. FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
214. See supra Part III.A.1.
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luate the ―wisdom‖ of the lawmaker.215 These statements seem
based on the Court‘s more general self-perception that a court
is a body with inferior institutional capacity and bounded democratic legitimacy to second-guess lawmaking. But if it is
another court that it is reviewing, may not one ―not-wellsuited‖ court feel unconstrained in passing judgment on a
state-level institution suffering from the same shortcomings?
B. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS ON REVIEWING JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
To further investigate the potential peculiarities of federal
judicial review of state judicial lawmaking, this Part briefly
identifies more general principles of federal judicial intervention in state court decision making and analyzes the way in
which these broader-based considerations implicate the particular dilemmas addressed in the Article.
1. Fact and Law Finding
Consider, first, the general principles under which federal
judicial review evaluates questions of fact and law decided by
state courts, as compared with the federal assessment of lawand fact-finding by the state legislative and executive branches.
As for fact finding, the two chief reasons for judicial deference
to the legislative—and, to a lesser extent, executive branches—
are, first, that legislators and regulators are institutionally superior in gathering and assessing facts,216 and second, that
courts generally lack the authority or political legitimacy to
question fact finding, especially when it is made by the legislature.217 Accordingly, the Court has ruled that with respect to
such fact finding, made on either the federal or state level,
those challenging it ―must convince the court that the legislative facts . . . could not reasonably be conceived to be true by
215. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); Beach
Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313.
216. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994) (―As
an institution . . . Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to ‗amass
and evaluate vast amounts of data‘ . . . . And Congress is not obligated, when
enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative
agency or court does to accommodate judicial review.‖ (citations omitted)).
217. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R.
Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136–38 (1968) (deferring to the Arkansas legislature‘s decision to increase safety by requiring full train crews, reasoning that the ―question of safety in the circumstances of this case is essentially a matter of public
policy, and public policy can, under our constitutional system, be fixed only by
the people acting through their elected representatives‖).
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the governmental decision maker.‖218 While this approach has
been criticized219 and legislatures and administrators have not
been immune from review of their fact finding,220 such bodies
enjoy substantial deference due both to institutional capacity
and democracy.221
In contrast, constraints on federal judicial review of fact
finding by state courts are premised on relatively soft conceptions of federalism and, more dominantly, on self-limiting rules
of practice. As a result, the Court has allowed itself to engage,
in certain situations, in independent judgment of the factual
basis of certain constitutional claims. This is clearly the case
when state courts explicitly focus on questions of federal constitutional law and make factual findings to arrive at legal conclusions. In Norris v. Alabama,222 in the context of racial exclusion from state juries, the Court reasoned that ―whenever a
conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal right and findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that
the appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured.‖223
After Norris, limits on the Court‘s review of state court
fact-finding rest not primarily on federalism, but rather on the
general delineation of the Court‘s appellate jurisdiction.224 But
these limits have not prevented the Court from practically
making independent judgment on application of constitutional
law, such as the areas of coerced confessions, free speech,225 or
in the collateral review of habeas corpus.226 As Henry Monag218. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1981)
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
219. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that legislatures do ―a
poor job of gathering and assessing facts‖ and that these fact-finding shortcomings are ―particularly stark when laws restrict core personal rights and
liberties‖).
220. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 666 (―That Congress‘ predictive judgments are
entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that they are insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether.‖).
221. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
222. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
223. Id. at 589–90.
224. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 229, 261 (1985).
225. Id. at 260–62.
226. A federal statute requires federal courts to defer to factual findings
made in state court when considering some habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1) (2006) (―In a proceeding . . . for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
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han notes, although the formulas for allowing the Court to review state court fact finding vary—including reviewing ―intermingled‖ questions of law and fact, ensuring that the federal
right was not ―denied in substance,‖ or the need to determine
whether ―sufficient evidence existed‖—―the entire substance of
constitutional fact review ha[s] become the operative measure
of the Supreme Court‘s general appellate jurisdiction.‖227
What would be the result when a federal court reviews a
state court‘s fact and law finding in a more conventional matter
of state law—such as a common law doctrine—that is nevertheless contested as implicating a certain federal constitutional
right? Three principles regularly inform the understanding of
the Court‘s appellate authority over such judgments of state
courts of last resort. First, the Supreme Court‘s jurisdiction is
limited ―to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal
law.‖228 Second, a state court judgment resting upon an ―adequate and independent‖ nonfederal ground precludes the Court
from reviewing ―even the erroneously determined federal issues
in the case.‖229 Third, and potentially most relevant in the context of reviewing state judicial lawmaking, is the principle by
which the federal reviewing court is generally ―bound to accept
the interpretation of [the State‘s] law by the highest court of
the State.‖230
The latter principle, which limits the federal court to considering if the state court‘s determination of state law was
based on a ―fair and substantial basis,‖ has been somewhat
modified, and several comments by Justice Scalia in Stop the
Beach put into question whether this principle would have any
significant weight in reviewing potential ―judicial wrongs.‖231
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by
clear and convincing evidence.‖) Notwithstanding, the Court has reserved its
power to intervene, as ―[a] federal court can disagree with a state court‘s credibility determination and . . . conclude the decision was unreasonable or that
the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.‖ Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
227. Monaghan, supra note 224, at 261–62.
228. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874).
229. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919,
1924 (2003) (referring to Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945)).
230. Id. (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ.
Ass‘n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976)).
231. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t. of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609–10 (2010).
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Bush v. Gore,232 one of the Court‘s most contested opinions in
recent years,233 also implicated the ―fair and substantial basis‖
test.234 Stepping in for Florida‘s Supreme Court in determining
the meaning of Florida‘s election law, the Court practically deviated from this principle. This was done in order to review
(and ultimately agree with) the petitioner‘s argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause imposed a
duty of fidelity to Florida‘s election law as stated by the legislature at the time of the election, and that the state court‘s later
―interpretation‖ of it impermissibly altered the law and thus
violated that constitutional duty.235 In his concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that ―[t]hough we generally
defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law . . . there
are of course areas in which the Constitution requires this
Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis
of state law.‖236
Federal judicial intervention in the determination of state
law by the state‘s court of last resort, when a change in state
law could in itself have federal constitutional implications, may
sound befitting also for the circumstances of the Stop the Beach
case, or for that matter, for the two hypothetical examples set
out above. And indeed, although Justice Scalia does not refer to
Bush v. Gore, he does address the potential implications of the
plurality‘s opinion on the ―fair and substantial basis‖
principle.237
Scalia reasons that ―[t]o assure that there is no ‗evasion‘ of
our authority to review federal questions, we insist that the
nonfederal ground of decision have ‗fair support.‘‖238 This
means, reasons Scalia, ―that there is a ‗fair and substantial basis‘ for believing that petitioner‘s Members did not have a property right to future accretions which the Act would take away.
This is no different, we think, from our requirement that peti232. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) ( per curiam).
233. See Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 612–18 (2002) (surveying the various criticisms).
234. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 –11.
235. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 112–14.
237. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t. of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2608 (2010). This was done in response to respondents‘ argument
that in a case claiming a judicial taking, the Court should add this principle to
its normal takings inquiry. Id.
238. Id.
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tioner‘s Members must prove the elimination of an established
property right.‖239
In a subsequent footnote, Scalia rejects Justice Breyer‘s
view that ―we do not set forth ‗procedural limitations or canons
of deference‘ to restrict federal-court review of state-court property decisions.‖240 ―It is true,‖ writes Scalia, ―that we make our
own determination, without deference to state judges, whether
the challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established
property right. That is unsurprising because it is what this
Court does when determining state-court compliance with all
constitutional imperatives.‖241 At the same time, he reasons:
The test we have adopted, however (deprivation of an established
property right), contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts. A property right is not established if there is
doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make
our own assessment but accept the determination of the state
court.242

This ―restriction‖ does not mean much, however, and it is
probably no surprise that Scalia does not mention Bush v. Gore,
in which the Court determined previous state law. Accordingly,
if it is the state court‘s change of the common law that creates a
potential constitutional violation, a reviewing federal court has
no alternative but to determine both what state law has been,
and what it is following the state judicial action.243 It therefore
seems clear enough that in reviewing an alleged constitutional
wrong, resulting from a change to a common law doctrine introduced by the state court, the Court would have to preserve
the power to independently determine both the former and the
current state law. This is, therefore, yet another peculiarity
stemming from the judicial review of judicial lawmaking: when
the state court itself is suspected of committing a constitutional
wrong, the federal reviewer could not defer to the ―fair and substantial basis‖ and to the state court in learning the content of
the state‘s common law.

239. Id.
240. Id. at 2608 n.9.
241. Id. at 2608–09 n.9.
242. Id. at 2609–10 n.9.
243. In Stop the Beach, Florida‘s Supreme Court depicted the common law
right to accretions as a future contingent interest rather than a vested property interest; Scalia tries to smooth this gap by saying that this distinction does
not matter for the takings claim. Id. at 2601 n.5.
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2. ―Full Faith and Credit‖ in State Judicial Wrongs?
Another jurisdictional issue, which may entail peculiar
consequences in the context of judicial lawmaking, is that of
claim- and issue-preclusion. While this rule generally makes
sense in preventing repetitive litigation in state and then federal courts, it creates unique conceptual difficulties when the
state court of last resort is the body whose actions are those
that had arguably committed a federal constitutional wrong
against the plaintiff.
The source of preclusion is located in Article IV, § 1, of the
Constitution, under which ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.‖244 Congress has codified the principle, such that ―judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United
States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State . . . .‖245 These provisions have long been interpreted by
the Court as encompassing both claim preclusion (res judicata)
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).246
What does this principle mean in the context of federal
constitutional rights? For most constitutional claims, a litigant
arguing for an infringement of a constitutional right could elect
whether to go to a state court or to a federal district court to
pursue the action.247 The ―Full Faith and Credit‖ principle
would bar her from relitigating in the other forum the causes of
action or decided issues.248 Although such an ―either-or‖ approach may create some difficulties in allocating jurisdiction
over some disputes and in ensuring that the adjudicating court
provides parties with a full opportunity to raise their various
claims,249 ―Full Faith and Credit‖ claim- and issue-preclusion
serves an important goal of preventing a legal scenario in
which ―an end could never be put to litigation.‖250

244. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
246. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336
(2005).
247. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 286 (5th ed. 2007).
248. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 336.
249. For a detailed analysis of the allocation of cases between state and
federal courts, and a criticism of the prevailing ―either-or‖ approach, see Barry
Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1216–26 (2004).
250. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 336–37.
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Jurisdictional complexities arise, however, when the resolution of a federal constitutional claim requires an extensive
inquiry into the relevant state law. Under the abstention rule
set forth in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., a federal district court should stay its hands from a dispute if the federal
cause of action is embedded in a certain state law question, especially when resolution of the state law matter could make the
federal question no longer required.251 In England v. Louisiana
State Board of Medical Examiners, the Court held that if the
state law adjudication has not resolved the federal law questions, the litigant could then return to the federal court to pursue the matter.252 But as is often the case, the state court will
also address and decide federal constitutional law issues if either of the parties raise them.253 The plaintiff could then be
barred from ever introducing the federal questions to, and having them decided by, a federal district court.254
One area in which a combination of abstention, ripeness,
and preclusion rules has led to the practical result of a federal
constitutional claim never making it to a federal district court,
is that of a ―regulatory takings‖ claim. In Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, the Court held that a regulatory taking claim is generally
―unripe‖ for federal review until the plaintiff seeks both (1) a
final decision by the governmental agency, and (2) payment of
―Just Compensation‖ for the taking under available state law
and procedure.255
In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, the plaintiff attacked a city ordinance reclassifying a hotel as for residential use only—as both a facial and ―as-applied‖ taking, as
well as a violation of substantive due process.256 After the federal district court held that the federal causes of action were
either unripe under Williamson County or barred by the statute of limitations in the case of the facial-taking claim, the
state court found for the defendants.257 The petitioner‘s attempt
to return to the federal court to litigate the federal questions
was then blocked.258 The Court held that only the facial-taking
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

RR. Comm‘n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941).
375 U.S. 411, 418–19 (1964).
See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 339.
See id. at 338– 40.
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 330.
Id. at 330–34.
Id. at 334 –35.
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claim was ripe for federal review under Williamson County, but
that the plaintiff had then voluntarily raised it before the state
court so that it became precluded.259 As for the other federal
claims, which were viewed as initially unripe for federal district
review and then decided by the California courts, the Court
held that ―even when the plaintiff would have preferred not to
litigate in state court, but was required to do so by a statute or
prudential rules,‖ then ―issues actually decided in valid statecourt judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the ‗right‘ to
have their federal claims relitigated in federal court.‖260
The Court refused to carve out an exception to the claimand issue-preclusion, even though the plaintiff was initially
prevented from electing to litigate its federal law claims in a
federal district court because its regulatory-takings claim was
unripe under Williamson County.261 According to the plurality
opinion,
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical matter, a
significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal
takings claims in state courts . . . . State courts are fully competent to
adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal
courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulation.262

The plurality thus gives, in the context of this case, an enthusiastic positive answer to the question of parity, i.e.,
―whether, overall, state courts are equal to federal courts in
their ability and willingness to protect federal rights.‖263 This
conclusion, however, is debatable.264
259. Id. at 340– 41.
260. Id. at 342.
261. See id. at 338, 344 – 46.
262. Id. at 346– 47. A concurring opinion by four Justices agrees that no
exception should be made to the preclusion principles once the claim has been
decided by the state court. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). But it casts
doubts on the wisdom of Williamson County, which prevents litigants asserting a regulatory taking claim from initially electing to pursue it in a federal
court, so that ―federal takings claims [are] singled out to be confined to state
court, in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional directive.‖
Id. at 351.
263. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 36.
264. See id. at 38–39 (viewing parity as an empirical question that lacks
credible methods of measurements); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06, 1116–28 (1977) (arguing that federal courts
enjoy better competence, higher attitudinal inclination to enforce constitutional rights, and insulation from political pressures). Others have looked to political accountability and competitive federalism as partly balancing potential
gaps. See Eric A. Lindberg, Comment, Multijurisdictionality and Federalism:
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But whatever the general inclinations about parity, the
context of state judicial lawmaking creates a clear paradox. On
the one hand, entrusting the state court with deciding federal
constitutional claims against its own rulemaking seems simply
self-contradictory. Since courts, unlike the legislature or the
executive, have no ―purse,‖ they would probably never admit to
effecting a taking, or to committing some other constitutional
wrong that could immediately undermine their own legitimacy.265 From this perspective, while state courts have lawmaking
powers, and otherwise have power to review the constitutionality of government actions, they obviously cannot exercise both
powers at the same time.266 State judicial lawmaking might
therefore seem the paradigmatic case for granting federal
courts broad jurisdiction to guard against constitutional
wrongs.
But on the other hand, opting for the other conventional alternative—federal district court jurisdiction—might also prove
awkward. Assume a case in which a judicial reform in a certain
common law doctrine is first made by a state‘s trial court, and
the losing party argues that this judicial lawmaking results in
a certain constitutional wrong. Should the plaintiff be allowed
to now take the case immediately to a federal district court to
review her federal constitutional claim? Does it not make much
more sense to have superior state courts, up to the state court
of last resort, review this piece of state judicial lawmaking on a
state common law doctrine, before it is turned over to federal
jurisdiction? Would not an approach of state-federal ―zigzag‖
jurisdiction undermine the entire structure of the state court
system and the tiered system of appellate review?
What about a third option, by which the case would go all
the way up to the state court of last resort, and only then be
steered to a federal district court? This runs the risk of violating issue- and claim-preclusion rules not only technically, because the plaintiff would rarely be able or inclined to disregard
federal law questions in the state courts, but also normatively,
because it undermines the very basic idea of ―Full Faith and
Credit,‖ that prevents scenarios in which ―an end could never
be put to litigation.‖267
Assessing San Remo Hotel’s Effects on Regulatory Takings, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1819, 1855–59 (2010).
265. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (finding the Supreme Court‘s authority is based on public confidence).
266. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 886–88, 889–901.
267. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 336–37.
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At the same time, the solution we are left with as a matter
of default—that all cases of judicial lawmaking by state courts
of last resort are reviewed, if at all, only by the U.S. Supreme
Court under its power to issue a writ of certiorari268—raises in
itself some difficult dilemmas, which I touch on briefly below.
3. The ―Error-Correction‖ Role of Certiorari
Assume that federal constitutional challenges to judicial
lawmaking by state courts of last resort would indeed require a
writ of certiorari by the Court. How would the Court‘s policy on
the matter be different from its issuance of similar writs, when
legislative or administrative lawmaking is challenged on similar grounds and the matter has then been litigated by the state
court of last resort? Once again, I focus attention on traditional
common law doctrines that arguably implicate a ―governmental
wrong.‖ Probably unsurprisingly, the Court‘s review of state
judicial lawmaking poses a genuine puzzle that does not sit comfortably with the Court‘s broader policy on the role of certiorari.
The Court‘s policy on exercising its ―error-correction‖ function by issuing writs of certiorari is articulated in Rule 10 of the
Supreme Court Rules.269 Under Rule 10(c), a writ can be issued
when ―a state . . . court has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.‖270 At the
same time, Rule 10‘s concluding section provides that ―[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.‖271
This latter provision is understood to reflect a policy by
which the Court is ―less concerned about rectifying isolated errors in the lower courts,‖ believing ―that a relatively small
number of nationally binding precedents is sufficient to provide
doctrinal guidance for the resolution of recurring issues.‖272 The
underlying assumption is that state courts of last resort can be
generally trusted with implementing the broad principles laid
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
269. SUP. CT. R. 10, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010
RulesoftheCourt.pdf.
270. Id. R. 10(c).
271. Id. R. 10. This latter addition to Rule 10 was promulgated in 1995. See
infra note 272.
272. Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 430–31.
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down by the Court, so that even if the fifty states will not reach
ultimate harmony in every single case, a satisfactory level of
uniformity will be maintained in applying federal law principles, including when these become entangled with specific
state law questions.273
How would this working assumption fare in the case of a
state judicial wrong? On the one hand, opening every potential
state court dispute to a review by the Court, in contrast to the
otherwise contractive approach of granting writs of certiorari,
runs the risk of gate flooding, as Justice Breyer suggested in
his concurring opinion in Stop the Beach.274
Moreover, as a normative matter, it is debatable what degree of harmonization is really required at the state level, especially when the cases involve traditional common law doctrines.
To the extent that Erie‘s rule that ―there is no federal common
law‖275 reflects a federalist principle by which common law
matters are better left for the states, one might argue that even
if these doctrines involve federal law questions, there should be
room for greater discretion to state courts of last resort in developing these doctrines.
But, on the other hand, if the state court of last resort is itself the potential wrongdoer under the Federal Constitution,
would not the Court, in refusing to accept cases whose potential
errors consist of ―erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law‖276 simply turn a blind eye
to potential constitutional wrongs? Even if we otherwise view
state courts of last resort as reliable guardians who would defend federal constitutional rights when these rights are infringed by state legislative and administrative bodies—who will
guard the guardians when the state court of last resort engages
in judicial lawmaking in a common law doctrine, but in so
doing deprives an individual of a federal constitutional right
and misapplies the Court‘s created rules of law?

273. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law
Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 271, 273 (2006) (criticizing this approach as not focusing on application
and tolerating substantial inconsistency and unpredictability that sometimes
―rises to a level that should be intolerable under the rule of law‖).
274. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2618–19 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring).
275. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
276. SUP. CT. R. 10.
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C. THE CIRCULARITY OF DELINEATING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
The range of issues analyzed in Sections A and B leads to
the conclusion that once the full scope of ―judicial wrongs‖ is
induced from the emerging concept of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine, any attempt to neatly define the nature and scope of
―judicial review of judicial lawmaking‖ would basically turn into a vicious cycle.
Throughout the history of the common law, courts have
been able to manage the delicate task of being both objective
adjudicators who protect individuals from violation of rights by
the government and state actors that engage in lawmaking.277
But once the conflict of interests deriving from this Janus-faced
nature of courts is allegedly exposed, then defining the scope of
judicial review of judicial lawmaking, without entirely collapsing the fundamental role of courts in the legal system, becomes
a highly frustrating endeavor.
My guess is that some of the tautologies and institutional
quagmires described in the above Sections, which relate to
more functional and technical aspects of the work of state and
federal courts, could be generally resolved, even if not perfectly.
One could assume that, over time, if the concept of a ―judicial
constitutional wrong‖ becomes a prevailing notion as an inevitable extension of the ―judicial taking‖ doctrine, then the Court
could come up with some adjustments for claim- and issue preclusion, or for evaluating its own discretionary power of granting certiorari, so as to reach a generally workable framework.
But the most pressing and troubling issue of circularity,
from a normative standpoint, is the one implicating the political and institutional legitimacy of courts. The entire structure
of government and the constitutional system is built on the underlying concept by which the political branches—the legislature and the executive—are the bodies entrusted with the onus
of legal norm making.278 As such, these bodies enjoy a substantial amount of deference in making policy choices and in transforming social values into legal rights and duties.279 Recall Justice O‘Connor‘s statement in Lingle against expanding the
scope of the ―substantively advances‖ test, because this ―would
require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state
277. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 2; Schauer, supra note 36, at
886–88.
278. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1; id. art. II, §§ 2–3.
279. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994).
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and federal regulation—a task for which courts are not well
suited.‖280 But where does this statement leave us when judicial lawmaking in a certain common law doctrine is at stake?
Does it necessarily come down to a jurisprudential dead end, by
which the judicial lawmaker must be deferred to because it is a
lawmaker but it cannot be deferred to because it is a court?
The reason that we grant power to courts to assess, and at
times invalidate, the lawmaking products of legislatures and
administrators is because courts are conceived in this context
to be objective guardians, who are willing and able to enforce
constitutional rights against the popular will.281 But what happens when a lawmaking court assumes the role of government?
Can it still be trusted not to overlook individual rights in promoting a broad-based social policy? Or has it now turned into a
full-fledged arm of government that loses its legitimacy as a
guardian?
These problems can probably never be resolved fully and
hermetically. But in order to alleviate these difficulties so that
they do not entirely undermine the judiciary and the system of
government more generally, one needs to develop a general
theory of the democratic legitimacy of courts to engage in lawmaking and of the corresponding division of labor among Government‘s different branches. Although these issues are pertinent to all fields of law, I focus attention again on traditional
common law doctrines. It is within this realm that Part IV suggests a tentative framework for a legitimization of judicial
lawmaking, while addressing the potential problem of judicial
wrongs.
IV. SCALING DOWN THE CONCEPT OF
JUDICIAL WRONGS
In this Part, I argue that, at least as far as common law
doctrines are concerned, we can articulate a model of political
legitimacy for courts to engage in lawmaking. While such a
model does not serve as a panacea for all issues pertaining to
the allocation of powers among the different branches of government, it does serve the purpose of significantly scaling down
the potential peculiarities of ―judicial wrongs‖ jurisprudence. It
is important to note that this model does not purport to depict
the historical evolution of the division of labor among legislatures and courts in the Anglo-American system, but to suggest
280. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 – 45 (2005).
281. See Neuborne, supra note 264, at 1127–28.
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a contemporary model that would entrench the political legitimacy of courts.
The suggested model does so by attributing the power of
courts to engage in lawmaking to an implicit mandate by the
political branches, such power going beyond the otherwise wellestablished authority of courts to engage in dispute resolution.
This type of mandate is especially entrenched when legislatures and administrative agencies, acting in the ―age of statutes,‖282 promulgate norms that govern a certain field of common law, but at the same time, these norms are designed as
relatively vague or otherwise open-ended.
As I explain below, such ―legal standards‖ should be seen
as delegating authority to courts to fill the norms with thicker
content over time, while at the same time maintaining the original attribution of the legal ordering to the relevant political
branch. In so doing, the model works to better conceptualize
most potential cases of ―judicial wrongs‖ as more conventional
―governmental wrongs‖ that should be reviewed by the Court
along its traditional lines of jurisprudence. Even in the instances in which a particular piece of judicial lawmaking does
not fit comfortably within such a conceptualization, the basic
tenets of the model alleviate much of the institutional quagmires and circular reasoning that could haunt judicial review of
judicial lawmaking in the aftermath of Stop the Beach.
A. LEGISLATIVE RULES AND STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL
LAWMAKING
The rules-versus-standards debate has been one of the focal points of the contemporary discourse on form and substance
in jurisprudence.283 As I have shown elsewhere, much of this
new theoretical discussion does not seek to consecrate either
hard-edged ―rules‖ or open-ended ―standards‖ as inherently superior.284 The discussion portrays the comparative advantages
of rules and standards as contingent on the empirical or sys282. See CALABRESI, supra note 98.
283. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM & SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 1– 41 (1987). Atiyah and Summers present proformalism ―second-order‖ considerations, such as the need for finality, systematic cost-effectiveness, and minimizing the overall risk of error. Their analysis thus levels formalism to a realm that until then had been occupied by legal
realism‘s anti-formalist critique. It incorporates pragmatism and empiricism
into the heart of the new formalist argument. Id.
284. See Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role
of Legal Standards, RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1618768.
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temic tradeoff of social costs and benefits accruing to both decision makers and the recipients of the legal norms.285
In one such prominent work, Louis Kaplow looks at this
potential tradeoff for public decision makers, by evaluating factors such as information costs or the frequency and probability
that a dispute will arise.286 According to Kaplow, rules are more
costly to enact than standards, because rules involve extensive,
up-front, and elaborate determinations of the law‘s content.287
However, vague standards create higher costs during the implementation and enforcement stages: parties and their legal
advisers take pains to predict potential outcomes, and courts
must engage in a more detailed ex post inquiry to decide the
law in specific disputes.288 Studies along similar veins have also
been done with respect to private forms of lawmaking, mainly
the formulation of contracts.289
A central assumption in this literature is that even if we
consider clear-cut, up-front legislative rules to be superior, this
goal cannot always be attained. Every field of private law (or
public law, for that matter) has an inherent feature of incompleteness. Even the most prudent legislature cannot anticipate
and regulate in advance all contingencies and scenarios that
may arise with respect to a certain norm. Thus, property, contract, tort, and unjust enrichment statutes will always remain
incomplete to some extent.290
Under this conceptual framework of incompleteness, rules
are understood as legal provisions that are more exhaustive
than standards not only in the sense that they are initially
phrased in more concrete clear-cut terms, but also in the sense
that dispute resolution in regard thereto should focus on ―a
more limited set of authoritative or evidentiary materials,‖291
285. See id.
286. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150–55 (1995).
287. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 568–69 (1992).
288. See id. at 579–86.
289. Contractual parties decide whether to take the costly action of writing
an as-complete-as-possible contract. Their choice hinges on balancing such
―front-end‖ costs against the anticipated ―back-end‖ costs of resolving disputes
over vague contract terms. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
187, 189–91 (2005).
290. For the different types of ―incompleteness‖ in property law, see Lehavi, supra note 284 (manuscript at 27– 44).
291. Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Con-
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like the specific wording of a given statute or contract. Alternatively, standards are understood as initially vague norms, given
content during extensive ex post judicial inquiry.292
The debate over the appropriate design of legal norms, especially to the extent that that debate implicates the level of
discretion awarded to courts during adjudication, has not focused solely on consequentialist considerations. It also centers
upon several arguments that have become especially prominent
since the emergence of legal realism. According to the realist
view, the legal system should embrace a ―substantive‖ approach to law—one that always looks to connect the application
of legal norms to the societal values and goals underlying the
norms.293 Under an aggressive version of this realist approach,
vagueness is considered inherently good, because it enables
courts to engage in highly detailed, ―situation-sense‖ adjudication.294 But more contemporary approaches that are sympathetic to substantive jurisprudence nevertheless try to toe the fine
line between ―norm-sensitivity‖—by which the application of
rules must have some regard to their normative justification to
avoid arbitrary and unjust results—and avoiding the dangers
of excessive ―context-sensitivity‖ that would deprive law of its
essential planning function.295 My suggested conceptualization
of legal rules and standards seeks to integrate the functional
incompleteness of up-front legislative norms with a limited degree of substance-oriented jurisprudence, by focusing on the
institutional structure of a legal standard. I thus define a standard as a legal provision that delegates the giving of fuller
norm-content to decision-making bodies other than the original
standard-setter.
In the context of this Article, this means that in the era of
the contemporary administrative State, when legislation or
administrative regulation is made in a certain field of common
law, a choice to enact certain legal standards, or to leave uncovered a significant number of relevant issues within this field,

tract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 515 (2004).
292. See Kaplow, supra note 287, at 559–60; Katz, supra note 292.
293. For a detailed analysis, see Lehavi, supra note 284 (manuscript at
11–16).
294. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268, 270–71 (1960).
295. See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contract Scholars Should Read Legal
Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract
Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1454 – 62, 1476–80 (2008).
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entails a delegation of authority to courts to engage in a dynamic process of giving or adding content to these standards.
Such a process does not, however, require that the legal
standard remain vague all the way down to a judicial casespecific inquiry. In many cases, the opposite would be true. Because no single field of common law could function properly
without ensuring a sufficient amount of stability, predictability,
and guidance, courts are compelled to refrain from engaging in
ad hoc jurisprudence. Nevertheless, legislative delegation of the
sort mentioned authorizes, and actually requires, courts to engage in a certain level of judicial lawmaking. The process by
which courts give content to legal standards not only clarifies to
the instant parties what the law is on a certain point, but also
creates a broader understanding of the legal norm and its application within the general field of law. Seen this way, judicial
lawmaking is not only a possible result of such a delegation—it
is often its inevitable purpose.
A prominent example of the promulgation of legal standards in state common law is found in the different states‘ versions of the Uniform Commercial Code, which include provisions such as ―commercial standards‖ and ―usages of trade.‖296
Perhaps the most notable standard in this context is that of
―good faith.‖297 Under Article 2 of the U.C.C., which applies to
merchants, ―good faith,‖ is defined as ―honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade.‖298 The latter part of this definition imposes an
objective good faith requirement that goes beyond the subjective good faith embedded in ―honesty in fact.‖299 In 2001, the
ALI expanded the U.C.C.‘s general Article 1 definition of ―good
faith‖ beyond simple ―honesty in fact‖ to include the objective
good faith component used under Article 2.300 This revision of

296. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 671.205 (2004) (defining a ―usage of trade‖);
§ 673.1031(d) (incorporating ―commercial standards‖ into a definition of ―good
faith‖); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2–609 ( McKinney 2002) ( basing the reasonableness
of grounds for insecurity between merchants upon ―commercial standards‖);
§ 2–202(a) ( providing that the terms of a written agreement may be supplemented by ―usage of trade‖).
297. U.C.C. § 2–103(1)( b) (2004).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. § 1–201( b)(20). For discussion of the development and revision of
the Article I ―good faith‖ definition, see Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant
of Good Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered
Relic, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 559, 609–10 (2006); and Franklin G. Snyder,
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the U.C.C. therefore extends the broader definition of good
faith to dealings involving non-merchants.301
This expansion of the scope of the good faith requirement
has led to mixed responses: some states have amended their
legislation in accordance with the U.C.C. revisions302 while others have refused to apply this additional objective standard to
non-merchants.303 I argue that the choice made by each state
legislature reflects not only a particular policy decision as to
whether non-merchants should be exposed to the same kind of
duties as merchants, but also a choice as to the appropriate
scope of the lawmaking mandate awarded to the state court for
purposes of developing this facet of private law. Entrusting
courts with the task of giving content to such a norm goes
beyond resolving specific disputes. In fact, it requires courts to
engage in lawmaking by delineating the broad contours of human conduct in everyday commercial dealings.
In addition to the promulgation of standards, legislatures
also mandate judicial lawmaking when they leave uncovered a
significant portion of the relevant issues within an otherwiselegislated field of law. The doctrine of adverse possession, introduced in Part III.A.1, illustrates, and is perhaps the quintessential example of, just such mandate granting. When one
looks at the development of this common law doctrine over centuries, it becomes clear not only that the law of adverse possession is in practice a combination of statutory and case law, but
also that it reflects a conscious decision by the legislatures to
leave some significant portions of the doctrine to judicial lawmaking.304
The doctrine originally evolved from judicial decisions resolving disputes over the application of a general statute of limitations, providing for a certain period of years after which
claims became barred.305 The doctrine has since developed way
beyond that initially limited scope. For instance, the doctrine
Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 40– 43 (2007).
301. See U.C.C. § 1–304 (2004) (―Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance
and enforcement.‖).
302. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.211( b)(22) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42a-1-201( b)(20) (2005).
303. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(19) (West 2007); FLA. STAT.
§ 671.210(19) (2004); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1–201(19) ( McKinney 2001).
304. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 120.
305. See Stake, supra note 200, at 2421–22 (noting that the relevant claim
limited by the statute has been an action in ejectment).
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now goes beyond claim immunity to grant adverse possessors
the positive right to take title to land.306 Additionally the courts
have expanded the nature of the adverse possession doctrine by
articulating numerous additional elements that the adverse
possessor must satisfy for the doctrine to apply. These elements
include entry that creates a cause of action, ―open and notorious‖ possession, that is ―continuous for the statutory period,‖
as well as ―adverse and under a claim of title.‖307 The latter
element has been especially endowed with a thick layer of legal
policy, often leading to highly diverging opinions among different state courts.308
The development of this entire array of law has thus been
left to the courts. Even though legislatures have often amended
the relevant period of years for introducing real property claims
through their general statutes of limitations309—meaning that
legislatures have kept pace with the doctrine so that the legislation has not simply remained untouched and anachronistic310—legislatures have nevertheless left it generally to courts
to continue engaging in lawmaking as pertains to the abovementioned components of the common-law doctrine.311
This does not mean that the mandate to courts to engage in
lawmaking is unlimited. Unlike the court‘s independent function to resolve specific disputes brought before it, legislatures
and administrative agencies can trump or truncate the
mandate for judicial lawmaking by deciding to amend or crystallize the underlying legal norms of a certain area of the law.
They may even do so as a response to a certain act of judicial
lawmaking. This should be uncontroversial even for supporters
of broad powers of judicial lawmaking. In the common law, the

306. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 116.
307. Id. at 120–22.
308. See id. at 131–35.
309.Stake, supra note 200, at 2421 n.11.
310. Id.
311. I therefore disagree with Duncan Kennedy‘s argument that under a
regime of legal standards, courts would engage in ―sub rosa lawmaking.‖ Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1690 (1976). Judicial lawmaking in these circumstances is not secret or subversive. It is rather a necessary process to fill initially vague norms
with content in a comprehensive and transparent fashion. It is a much clearer
and more straightforward process of developing the law than is the case when
a court uses the standard‘s vagueness as an excuse for uncontrolled ad hoc
jurisprudence.
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political branches generally have the final say about law‘s
content.
The suggested model breaks rank from Guido Calabresi‘s
thesis about the role of the courts in an ―age of statutes.‖312 Calabresi argues that the common law function of courts today ―is
no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a
retentionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an
existing statutory or common law rule.‖313 According to Calabresi, courts should thus exercise a judgmental function of deciding when a rule ―has come to be sufficiently out of phase
with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can
only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body
reaffirms it.‖314
In one way, this role strives for too little: it assigns courts
only with the negative task of guarding against anachronism or
blunt incoherence, rather than also with some positive power to
engage in developing the law. In many other ways, however,
Calabresi‘s approach grants courts an almost unbounded discretion, by allowing courts to take remedial action not only
through the promulgation of a norm, but also through the use
of ―techniques designed to influence the legislative and even
the administrative agendas.‖315 His model locates courts in an
adversarial position vis-à-vis the legislature or administrative
agency in the development of the common law. It requires
courts to engage in perpetual second-guessing of the other
branches‘ overall structuring, or ―legal framework,‖ of the
common law.
In contrast, the suggested delegation model promoted here
is one of collaboration. It allows the legislature to entrust the
court with the role of lawmaking, by adopting a strategy of
promulgating certain norms as standards or to leave certain
issues within a legal field as more appropriate for judicial development. Furthermore it always allows the legislature (subject to the court‘s otherwise-based power of constitutional review) to update or truncate such mandate by introducing a new
piece of legislation or regulation.316
312. CALABRESI, supra note 98.
313. Id. at 164.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Calabresi also purports to avoid ―depriving popular or representative
bodies of their last say.‖ Id. at 164 –65. Unlike the suggested delegation model,
however, Calabresi‘s model places the preserved role of the legislature squarely within an adversarial framework that pits judiciary against legislature. Id.
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B. THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE MODEL AND ―JUDICIAL
WRONGS‖
The outlined delegation model could play an important role
in scaling down the potential superfluous effects of judicial
wrongs jurisprudence. The implicit delegation of authority by
the legislative and executive branches to courts to engage in
judicial lawmaking pursuant to initially vague or lacking common law legislation preserves the original attribution of lawmaking to these political branches. This means that, when the
Court assesses the potential infringement of federal constitutional rights by judicial lawmaking, the original motives, core
policies, and accountability for policy- and law-making would
generally be attributed to the underlying statutory or executive
act.
Accordingly, the vast majority of cases that might be depicted in the aftermath of Stop the Beach as ―judicial lawmaking wrongs‖ could and should be reconceptualized as more conventional ―governmental wrongs.‖ Such potential violations of
constitutional rights should thus be evaluated by the Court
along its traditional lines of judicial review. Instead of referring
to the state court as a self-standing policymaker, and in so
doing becoming entangled in the institutional quagmires portrayed in Part III, the Court should look to the underlying statutory or executive act as the source of the contested norm.
The idea here is neither to delineate some simplistic ―vicarious liability‖ model, nor to engage in ancillary issues such as
the potential expansion of the nondelegation doctrine as a constitutional or institutional limit on judicial lawmaking.317 It is
rather intended to locate judicial lawmaking in a more genuine
and realistic framework of understanding the role of courts in
the era of the modern administrative State, rather than being
tempted to follow the allegedly natural trajectory of the postStop the Beach jurisprudence.
What is probably most striking in this respect is the fact
that the Stop the Beach case in itself is not really a ―judicial
taking‖ case. What the Florida Supreme Court did, following
the certification of the question ―does the Beach and Shore Pre317. For the latter idea, see Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 405, 421– 43 (2008) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine which has
somewhat limited, even if in a declining fashion, Congress‘s ability to delegate
lawmaking authority to the executive and arguing that the doctrine‘s underlying ideas could apply at times to the federal judiciary).
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servation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?,‖ was to examine the
Florida legislature‘s Act, and to answer whether the Act adversely affected previously existing common law property
rights so as to result in a taking.318
This is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court did. It reasoned that that the legal regime applying to restoration and
renourishment projects conformed to the common law principle
of avulsion.319 Moreover, the legislature had demonstrated an
awareness of the background of existing common law rules
against which it acted by providing that landowners would continue to be entitled ―to all common-law riparian rights‖ except
for the right to accretions.320 So even if the U.S. Supreme Court
were to come to the conclusion that the Act violated the Takings Clause, so that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong, the
Court should have attributed the motives and underlying policy
choices to Florida‘s political branch, while independently assessing the federal law questions.321
Such attribution would make perfect sense, for purposes of
federal judicial review, in many other contexts that could have
hypothetically been depicted as judicial-wrong cases in the aftermath of Stop the Beach. Going back to the adverse possession example, a depiction of the ―continuous possession‖ reform
as a judicial act entirely detached from the doctrine‘s legislative
background would in itself be detached from legal reality. The
development of the doctrine over centuries as a mixture of statutes and case law reveals a scheme of institutional collaboration.322 If the legislature were to think that the state court went
overboard in its most recent development of the doctrine, it
could always revise it and provide guidance for future judicial
lawmaking by using the rule-standard strategy.
Thus, for purposes of identifying the underlying motives,
goals, and background socioeconomic facts, a federal reviewing
318. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008).
319. Id. at 1114 –15.
320. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§161.011–.45 (West 2006).
321. One could speculate as to why the case was initially presented to the
Court as a judicial-taking case. It is possible that presenting the case in such
an innovative fashion increased the likelihood that the Court would issue a
writ of certiorari, that the petitioner hoped that the Court would scrutinize the
Florida Supreme Court‘s decision more stringently than if it were a regular
―appeal,‖ or that there were potential hurdles in asserting a facial-takings
claim due to the potential application of the statute of limitations.
322. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 120.
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court could rely on the way in which the institutional collaborative scheme has unfolded over time, while independently reviewing the federal law questions implicated by the development of the common law doctrine.
More generally, the difficulties that often exist in drawing
the lines between ―statutory interpretation‖ and ―judicial lawmaking‖—a problem that has otherwise troubled decision makers and commentators dealing with the legitimacy and institutional competence of courts to innovate—would not adversely
affect the suggest model.323 Quite the contrary: since under
both scenarios, attribution of the original lawmaking would be
made, for purposes of federal review, to the political branch,
state courts would have few incentives to purposely manipulate
the nature of their decisions.
My intention in suggesting the delegation model for understanding judicial lawmaking is not to depict courts as ―angels,‖
capable of doing no wrong. As I have stated in the Introduction,
there are enough cases in which the state judiciary should be
held solely responsible for infringing litigants‘ constitutional
rights. Judicial lawmaking, however, for the reasons set forth
above and especially in the context of common law doctrines,
represents an entirely different case.
My suggested approach does not purport to eliminate the
possibility of a judicial wrong scenario altogether. It would,
however, definitely scale it down, not only quantitatively, but
also, and perhaps even more so, qualitatively. The suggested
model would significantly ease the tension inherent in the potential undermining of the nature and structure of the judicial
branch that may follow as an unintended result of Stop the
Beach. It not only maintains judicial integrity, but also
attributes the origin of lawmaking to its natural locus: the political branches.
CONCLUSION
The Stop the Beach case is more than just another takings
case in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, and potentially implicates the conception of the balance of governmental power and
the proper role of courts in the process of rule-making in the
age of the modern administrative State. Whichever opinion is
323. See, e.g., Barak, supra note 41, at 46–53; Fallon, supra note 1, at
1813–27, 1842– 47; Scalia, supra note 35, at 9–18; Schauer, supra note 36, at
906–17; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 920–32 (2003).
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deemed more convincing—Scalia‘s introduction of the judicial
taking doctrine, Kennedy‘s application of substantive due
process for judicial ―dramatic‖ innovation, or Breyer‘s ―better
left for another day‖ approach—the case seems to have exposed
an open nerve in the American legal system. It allegedly unveils the trickery of state courts: that objective adjudicators
could engage in a violation of federal constitutional rights while
encroaching upon the lawmaking domains that are within the
province of the political branches. This possibility allegedly necessitates the creation of a new body of jurisprudence that conceptualizes and delineates the federal judicial review of state
judicial lawmaking.
Such a viewpoint, however, is twisted. On the one hand, it
simply ignores the way in which laws, and especially common
law doctrines, have developed over the course of centuries, including during the era of the contemporary administrative
State. Courts do not operate in hiding or need to engage in subterfuge to make law in these fields. On the other hand, it depicts courts as acting free of any constraints even though state
judicial lawmaking must conform to rights and duties under
the Federal Constitution and does not take place within a vacuum. At least as far as common law doctrines are concerned,
courts‘ lawmaking power, which exists alongside their independent dispute-resolution authority, is based on a collaborative scheme with the other branches of government. That power, however, while legitimate under the proper legal framework
and an indispensible aspect of the contextualization process of
legal standards and norms, eventually yields to legislative supremacy in law- and policy-making.
It would thus be a grave mistake to demonize courts for
developing the law, or, on the other hand, to release them from
any constraints in exercising their power. Fortunately, the solution to the host of institutional quagmires and conceptual
tautologies that the confused Stop the Beach decision might
have invoked lies within the well-established principles of the
American legal system.
In particular, the jurisprudential approach advanced in
this Article, by which the problem of ―federal judicial review of
state judicial wrongs‖ could generally be resolved by viewing
judicial lawmaking as premised on a broad but not unlimited
delegation of authority by the political branches, would largely
mitigate the danger of undermining the nature and structure of
the judicial branch. It would strengthen collaboration among
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the different branches of government within each state system,
and make better sense of the federal structure and the interpretation of federal constitutional rights. In so doing, the legal
system would be better able to address the constant need for
progress in law in the modern administrative State, while minimizing unintended implications that may undermine the delicate balance and power-sharing among the three branches of
the Government.

